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Haryana halts private power distributor's entry in Gurugram and Nuh

Haryana's regulator dropped a second power distribution licence for Gurugram and Nuh days after granting it, on the State's direction. The Centre is pushing for more competition among power distributors.

What happened

The Haryana Electricity Regulatory Commission (HERC) decided on Wednesday "not to proceed further" with a parallel distribution licence it had approved for Eleven Power Pvt. Ltd. in Gurugram and Nuh the previous week. A parallel licence lets a second company supply electricity in an area already served by an existing distributor. The Haryana government directed the reversal under Section 108(1) of the Electricity Act, which requires a State regulator to consider the government's written policy directions. The State's two government-owned distribution companies (discoms) had opposed the licence.

Context

The only parallel distribution arrangement in India is in Mumbai, where Tata Power, BEST and Adani Electricity serve overlapping areas. Eleven Power's would have been the second. The Centre wants more such competition. The Draft National Electricity Policy, 2026, and the Draft Electricity (Amendment) Bill, 2025, both retain provisions for parallel licensing. Under the Centre's proposed framework, new licensees would use the existing network by paying regulated wheeling charges instead of building their own poles and lines.

Why it matters

The dispute is about who pays for subsidised power. Under cross-subsidy, revenue from commercial and industrial consumers helps fund cheaper electricity for households and farmers. Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam (DHBVN) argued that Gurugram and Nuh account for 35.23% of its electricity sales and 42.98% of its revenue of Rs 9,493.75 crore in 2025-26. If high-paying consumers moved to a new supplier, it would be left with more subsidised users.

DHBVN put numbers on that risk. If 2.5% of its sales shifted to Eleven Power, it projected a revenue loss of Rs 424.12 crore in 2027-28. The loss rises to Rs 1,898.75 crore at 20% and Rs 4,272.19 crore at 45%.

Fixed costs make the problem worse. Capacity payments to generators, transmission charges, salaries and maintenance are 38-56% of a discom's annual revenue requirement, according to a Central Electricity Authority report. But fixed charges on consumer bills bring in only 9-20% of revenue. If consumers leave, the incumbent still carries most of these costs over a smaller base.

The counter-argument is efficiency and choice. Competition could improve service, and using the existing network avoids duplicating poles, lines and substations. The Haryana reversal shows that States, which own the discoms, can block that push.

Impact for India

  • Consumers in Gurugram and Nuh: lose, for now, the option of a second supplier.
  • DHBVN: keeps its highest-revenue area, which funds cross-subsidies to households and farmers.
  • Power-sector reform: the Centre's push for parallel licensing meets State resistance through Section 108 directions.
  • Federalism: electricity distribution reform depends on States that own the incumbent discoms.

Key data

Gurugram and Nuh share of DHBVN: 35.23% of sales; 42.98% of revenueDHBVN revenue Rs 9,493.75 crore in 2025-26
Projected DHBVN revenue loss, 2027-28: Rs 424.12 crore at 2.5% shiftRs 1,898.75 crore at 20%; Rs 4,272.19 crore at 45%
Discom fixed costs: 38-56% of annual revenue requirementFixed charges: 9-20% of revenue

Concepts

Parallel distribution licencePermission for more than one company to supply electricity to consumers in the same area.HERC approved one for Eleven Power, then withdrew it on the State's direction.
Cross-subsidyCharging some consumer groups more than cost so that others can be charged less.Commercial and industrial users in Gurugram help fund cheaper power for households and farmers.
Wheeling chargesFees a supplier pays to use another company's distribution network to deliver power.The Centre's framework would let new licensees pay these instead of building their own network.

Theory lens

Natural monopoly and cream-skimming — when one network can serve an area at lower cost than two, distribution is a natural monopoly, and opening it to entry lets newcomers target the most profitable customers. DHBVN's case is a cream-skimming argument: Gurugram and Nuh provide 42.98% of its revenue, so a rival winning high-paying users would leave the incumbent with subsidised users and largely fixed costs. The Centre's wheeling-charge model tries to keep one network while allowing competition in supply.

Stakeholders

Gains: DHBVNAvoids a projected revenue loss of Rs 424.12 crore to Rs 4,272.19 crore, depending on how much of its sales would shift.
Gains: Subsidised household and farm consumersThe cross-subsidy base in Gurugram and Nuh stays with the State discom.
Pressure point: Eleven Power Pvt. Ltd.Its approved licence will not be operationalised.
Pressure point: Commercial and industrial consumers in Gurugram and NuhThey lose the choice of supplier that competition promised.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to parallel electricity distribution licensing in India, consider the following statements:

  1. The only parallel distribution arrangement currently operating in India is in Gurugram.
  2. Haryana directed its regulator to drop the parallel licence under Section 108 of the Electricity Act, which requires a State regulator to consider the government's written policy directions.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: 2 only

  • Statement 1: Incorrect. The only such arrangement operates in Mumbai; the Gurugram-Nuh licence would have been the second and has been dropped.
  • Statement 2: Correct. The State invoked Section 108(1) to direct HERC not to operationalise the licence.

Therefore, the correct answer is 2 only.

Concept check — test your understanding

Why can a second distributor entering an area hurt the finances of the incumbent State discom even if total demand is unchanged?

  1. Because the new entrant can buy cheaper power from generators and force the incumbent to cut tariffs below cost.
  2. Because the incumbent must pay wheeling charges to the new entrant for using its network.
  3. Because the entrant can win high-paying commercial and industrial consumers, leaving the incumbent with subsidised users while its largely fixed costs remain.
  4. Because regulators must transfer the incumbent's long-term power purchase agreements to the entrant.
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: C

  • Cross-subsidy depends on high-paying users; if they leave, the incumbent spreads mostly fixed costs over a smaller, more subsidised base.
  • A overstates the mechanism: tariffs are regulated, and the source's concern is revenue loss, not forced price cuts.
  • B reverses the flow: under the Centre's model the new licensee pays wheeling charges to use the existing network.
  • D is wrong: the incumbent keeps its PPAs, which is why its fixed capacity payments are the problem.