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Parallel discom licensees and storage can end summer power cuts, writes Ajay Shankar

India's summer power cuts persist even at record generation, because distribution companies (discoms) under-invest in network capacity and rents leak into operations, argues Ajay Shankar, a former Secretary in the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion. His fix: parallel distribution licensees, solar-plus-storage at load centres, and pooling stranded gas capacity for peak hours.

What happened

In an Indian Express explainer, Ajay Shankar writes that this summer's contrast — record national peak demand met at the top of the system but frequent power cuts in wealthy Gurgaon apartments — shows the failure is at the distribution end, not generation. Discoms act as the last-mile provider of electricity, buying high-voltage supply from transmission and stepping it down for consumers. Where the network cannot handle rapid demand growth from air conditioning, the discom must impose cuts to protect grid stability. Shankar argues state governments and regulators must keep distribution capacity ahead of anticipated demand, and use parallel distribution licensees — as Mumbai has done for nearly two decades — to force competition into distribution.

Context

The Electricity Act, 2003 gives consumers a right to a reliable supply from the discom, with an independent regulator setting tariffs and overseeing performance. It limits state government role to policy, deciding which consumers (farmers, for example) get free or near-free power, and providing the subsidy. Mumbai has allowed parallel licensees such as Tata Power, BEST, and Adani Electricity to operate in the same area, giving consumers a real choice. Shankar notes that in the mid-1990s, the H D Deve Gowda Central government tried to encourage parallel licensees in cities with population above one million by offering cheaper power from Mega Power Projects (large stations of 1,000 MW or more) with import and excise duty exemptions. States took the cheap electricity but did not privatise, and the Central government eventually waived the conditionality.

Why it matters

Distribution is where India's power sector reform stalled. Regulated tariffs stay too low, revenues do not cover the investment needed to expand the network for rising peak demand, and rent-seeking around subsidies protects state ownership. The result: cheap generation upstream, unreliable supply downstream, and diesel generators filling the gap in high-value neighbourhoods with air, noise and CO2 pollution. Shankar's structural fix — parallel licensees, feed-in tariffs for rooftop solar, battery storage at load centres, and pooling stranded gas capacity for peak hours — repositions the discom from a monopoly rate-taker to a mix of competitive suppliers and cheaper, decentralised generation.

Impact for India

  • Urban consumers in weak-discom states: gain choice of supplier if parallel licensees are allowed, as in Mumbai.
  • Discoms: forced to invest in network capacity ahead of anticipated peak demand, backed by regulated revenues.
  • Rooftop solar and battery storage industry: feed-in tariffs and load-centre battery installations create direct pull for decentralised generation.
  • Backup diesel generator users: crowded out as reliability improves, reducing local air and noise pollution.
  • Stranded gas-based plants: pooled at national and discom level to supply expensive peaking power during summer.
  • Reform timeline: Shankar suggests a two- to three-year runway.

Key data

Mega Power Project capacity threshold: 1,000 MW or more
Reform runway suggested: 2-3 years
Duration of parallel-licensee operations in Mumbai: Close to two decades
Electricity Act: 2003

Concepts

Discom (Distribution Company)The utility that receives high-voltage electricity from the transmission grid, steps it down and delivers it to end consumers at usable voltage — the last-mile provider in the power supply chain.Shankar argues discom under-investment in the distribution network is why summer power cuts happen even when generation is adequate.
Parallel distribution licenseeA regulatory arrangement that allows more than one licensee to operate a distribution network in the same geographical area, so consumers can choose among suppliers.Mumbai's Tata Power, BEST and Adani Electricity have operated in parallel for close to two decades.
Rent-seekingProfiting by manipulating or capturing the political and regulatory system rather than by producing goods or services.Shankar cites intractable rent-seeking in power distribution as the reason parallel licensees became necessary.
Feed-in tariffA regulated price a utility pays to buy electricity from decentralised producers such as rooftop solar owners, designed to incentivise adoption.Shankar suggests an attractive feed-in tariff for rooftop solar to reduce discom costs, since solar is cheaper than thermal power and carries no transmission cost.

Theory lens

Natural-monopoly regulation with contestability — distribution has been treated as a natural monopoly, but parallel licensing introduces contestability into an activity previously considered non-competitive. Once entry is possible on the same wires or on parallel wires, the incumbent's pricing and service quality must respond to potential competition, shifting the equilibrium from a bilateral bargain between the regulator and a captive monopoly to something closer to a Bertrand contest between suppliers. Mumbai's near-two-decade experience is the empirical case Shankar builds on.

Historical parallel

In the mid-1990s the H D Deve Gowda Central government offered cheaper Mega Power Project electricity — from stations of 1,000 MW or more with duty exemptions — to states that would let in parallel licensees in cities of over one million population. States accepted the cheaper power and gave written undertakings to privatise but did not follow through; the Central government eventually waived the conditionality and accepted the policy's failure. Shankar reads this as a cautionary tale on political economy limits, not a rejection of parallel licensing itself.

Stakeholders

Gains: Urban consumersChoice of supplier where parallel licensees are permitted; more reliable summer supply.
Gains: Rooftop solar and battery storage firmsFeed-in tariff push and load-centre storage installations expand demand.
Gains: Independent regulatorsEmpowered to align tariffs with investment needs under the Electricity Act, 2003.
Pressure point: State-owned monopoly discomsLose exclusive territory and rent-seeking room where parallel licensees enter.
Pressure point: Diesel-generator users in Gurgaon-style locationsCrowded out as reliability improves.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to India's power distribution framework as discussed in the Indian Express explainer by Ajay Shankar, consider the following statements:

  1. The Electricity Act, 2003 gives consumers a right to a reliable, quality supply from the discom, overseen by an independent regulator.
  2. Mumbai has for close to two decades allowed parallel distribution licensees such as Tata Power, BEST and Adani Electricity to operate in the same area.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: Both 1 and 2

  • Statement 1: Correct because the Electricity Act, 2003 gives consumers a right to a reliable, quality supply, with an independent and empowered regulator.
  • Statement 2: Correct because Mumbai has allowed parallel licensees — Tata Power, BEST, Adani Electricity — for close to two decades.

Therefore, the correct answer is Both 1 and 2.

Concept check — test your understanding

In Ajay Shankar's diagnosis, why do neighbourhoods like Gurgaon face summer power cuts even when national generation and transmission meet record peak demand?

  1. Because national electricity generation capacity was inadequate to meet peak demand.
  2. Because the transmission grid frequency dropped below permissible limits nationwide.
  3. Because the distribution network's carrying capacity had not been augmented to match the rapid rise in demand from air conditioning, forcing the discom to impose cuts to protect grid stability.
  4. Because the Electricity Act, 2003 caps household consumption during summer months.
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: C

  • National peak demand was met at record levels; the failure is the distribution network capacity not keeping pace with air-conditioning demand, forcing the discom to impose cuts for grid stability.
  • A contradicts the article — generation was adequate.
  • B is not supported.
  • D invents a legal cap on household consumption.