Pay the Global South for climate damage, but price carbon first
Rich countries should pay people in developing countries directly for climate damage, conditional on those countries pricing carbon, argues economist Michael Greenstone with Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo.
What happened
Rich countries should pay people in developing countries for the climate damage their emissions cause, on condition that those countries put a price on carbon. That is the central proposal of a forthcoming book, Just Economics, by University of Chicago economist Michael Greenstone with Nobel-winning economists Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo. "We're proposing Indians receive money unencumbered," Greenstone said, adding that the payment would be based on the damage OECD countries' emissions are doing and "would go directly to the people, not to the government".
Context
Greenstone frames the proposal as a response to failure rather than a moral appeal. "82% of the emissions going forward are projected to be outside the OECD and moral appeals have failed," he said, adding that "the better angels-argument ain't working". The transfer would be contingent on the Global South adopting carbon pricing: "It's not for free. It's a deal. You have to give something to get something." He said the damage from carbon emissions to India can be calculated, though the exact parameters would have to be negotiated, and that such a deal need not involve the whole world — it could be struck between, say, the European Union and India. He pointed to "the more or less complete failure of climate finance to the Global South".
Why it matters
The argument rests on evidence from an actual market, not a model. The Surat Emissions Trading Scheme for particulate matter, first mooted with the Gujarat Pollution Control Board in 2010, was run as a randomised trial: 150 textile plants were assigned to a market and 150 stayed under conventional regulation. Compliance in the market was 99%, against about a third of industries out of compliance at any time under the status quo. The reason cutting emissions proved cheap is visible in the bids. Because the regulator could see what firms offered to buy and sell permits for, it could infer the actual cost of abatement — firms "had all the equipment and just had to start operating it". Enforcement was what made it work: a firm short of permits paid a fine of ten times the permit value. "Once the industry saw that the rules were going to be enforced then everything changed." That is the case for pricing over prescription, and it is why the conditionality in the payment proposal is not incidental.
Impact for India
- Indian households: The proposal routes payments directly to people rather than through government, based on calculated damage from OECD emissions.
- Indian industry: Pricing carbon is the condition attached to any transfer, which would extend the permit-market approach from local pollutants to carbon.
- Surat textile mills: The trial covered 150 plants in a market against 150 under conventional regulation, with compliance of 99% versus about a third out of compliance under the status quo.
- Maharashtra: The next market will cover sulphur dioxide and include large power plants, with a mock trading period using no real money already under way.
- Other States: Similar conversations are running with Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Haryana, and Gujarat has asked for help designing a water market and a Statewide sulphur dioxide market.
- Enforcement capacity: The binding constraint is measurement, since plants frequently switch off monitoring equipment, which Greenstone calls the Achilles heel of environmental regulation worldwide.
Key data
Concepts
Theory lens
Coasean bargaining over an externality — where property rights over a harm are clear and bargaining is possible, the parties can reach an efficient allocation through payment rather than through prohibition, whoever is assigned the right. The proposal applies that logic to the atmosphere: instead of asking the Global South to forgo emissions on moral grounds, OECD emitters pay for the damage, and the payment is traded against the recipient adopting carbon pricing. Greenstone's point that a deal "did not require the whole world" and could be struck between the European Union and India is exactly the bilateral bargain the framework predicts.
Historical parallel
The Surat scheme is the precedent the proposal leans on. Mooted with the Gujarat Pollution Control Board in 2010 and run as a randomised trial over 150 textile plants against 150 controls, it delivered 99% compliance where conventional regulation left about a third of industries out of compliance at any time. Enforcement was decisive: a shortfall drew a fine of ten times the permit value, and in Greenstone's account "once the industry saw that the rules were going to be enforced then everything changed".
Global context
The proposal is explicitly built on where emissions are heading rather than where they came from. The OECD, a grouping of mostly wealthy industrialised countries, has contributed most of the accumulated carbon in the atmosphere, while 82% of future emissions are projected to come from outside it, where incomes are lower and emissions are rising fast. Greenstone argues that gap is why moral appeals have failed and why a conditional transfer, negotiated bilaterally if necessary, is worth trying ahead of next month's climate meet in Turkey.
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Practice Question — from the story
With reference to the Surat Emissions Trading Scheme as described by economist Michael Greenstone, consider the following statements:
- The scheme was designed to control sulphur dioxide emissions from large power plants.
- Firms falling short of permits faced a fine equal to the value of the permits they lacked.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: Neither 1 nor 2
- Statement 1: Incorrect. The Surat scheme was designed to reduce particulate matter from textile mills. Sulphur dioxide and large power plants are the scope of the next market, in Maharashtra.
- Statement 2: Incorrect. The fine was ten times the permit value, and Greenstone credits that level of enforcement with changing industry behaviour.
Therefore, the correct answer is Neither 1 nor 2.
Concept check — test your understanding
In an emissions permit market, firms bid to buy and sell the right to pollute. Why does that bidding give a regulator information that conventional command-and-control regulation cannot?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: D
- A bid reveals what abatement actually costs the firm, because no one offers to sell a permit for less than it cost them to cut the emission. From those bids the regulator can infer the cost of achieving different total emission levels, which is exactly how the Surat trial found that cutting emissions was cheap: firms already had the equipment and simply had to run it.
- Option A describes monitoring technology, which remains the binding constraint either way; Greenstone calls the inability to track emissions second by second the Achilles heel of environmental regulation worldwide.
- Option B names total emissions, which the cap fixes by design under either regime, so it is not what the bidding reveals.
- Option C describes compliance rates, which were indeed far higher in the market at 99%, but that is the result of the scheme rather than the information the bids carry.