BRICS calls EU carbon border tax 'protectionist', demands tripling of adaptation finance
BRICS environment ministers, meeting in New Delhi under India's chair, condemned the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism as unilateral and protectionist, and urged developed countries to meet the 2025 commitment to triple adaptation finance by 2035.
What happened
At the 12th BRICS Environment Ministers' Meeting in New Delhi on August 18, 2026, held under India's chairship, the grouping opposed what it described as 'unilateral, punitive, discriminatory and protectionist' climate measures, including the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAMs). The joint statement said such carbon border measures could undermine developing countries' efforts on climate change and resilience. It also urged developed countries to meet the commitment agreed at the UN climate conference in 2025 to triple adaptation finance to developing countries by 2035.
Context
The EU's CBAM entered its definitive phase from January 1, 2026 and requires importers of carbon-intensive products — iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen and electricity — to account for the carbon emissions embedded in their production. The EU frames it as a defence against 'carbon leakage', the shift of carbon-intensive production outside the bloc because of differences in climate policies. India is particularly exposed through steel: iron and steel account for about 90% of India's exports to the EU that fall within the CBAM framework, according to a recent analysis. A June 2026 Nature Climate Change study, using shipment-level trade data, found high-emission Indian steel firms cut export quantities and revenues to the EU during CBAM's reporting phase while lower-emission firms held their volumes.
Why it matters
CBAM is a live case of climate policy operating as trade policy. For India, it lands just as the EU-India free trade agreement negotiated earlier this year is being implemented — creating a situation where market access improves on paper but is offset by carbon-related compliance costs at the border. The Nature Climate Change finding matters: CBAM is not a uniform tax on Indian steel, it is an implicit price on emissions intensity that reallocates export share within the industry towards lower-emission firms. On finance, the demand to triple adaptation funding highlights a persistent gap — adaptation historically receives less climate finance than mitigation.
Impact for India
- Indian steel exporters: iron and steel form about 90% of India's CBAM-covered exports to the EU, so high-emission Indian mills face the sharpest compliance burden and have already trimmed export quantities and revenues to the EU.
- Lower-emission Indian steel firms: the Nature Climate Change study finds they have maintained export levels, gaining relative EU market share as CBAM's reporting phase progressed.
- EU-India FTA users: the recently negotiated free trade agreement's tariff cuts sit alongside CBAM compliance costs, muting the net gain on the CBAM-covered goods.
- Indian aluminium, cement, fertiliser, hydrogen and electricity exporters: they fall inside the CBAM framework's scope from its definitive phase and face similar embedded-emissions accounting requirements.
- Climate-vulnerable Indian communities: adaptation needs — water security, agriculture, disaster preparedness — remain under-funded relative to mitigation, which the BRICS demand for tripled adaptation finance targets.
Key data
Concepts
Theory lens
Externality pricing at the border — a Pigouvian levy internalises a negative externality by pricing it at the point of transaction, and CBAM extends that logic across a border by pricing the embedded carbon in imports. From developing-country side the lens flips: the same border price acts as a non-tariff barrier because domestic producers do not receive a matching carbon rebate, so it works like Ricardo's tariff analysis on a country whose comparative advantage is currently carbon-intensive.
Global context
COP31 is scheduled in Turkey in November 2026, with adaptation finance among the issues that failed to produce agreement at the June 2026 climate talks in Bonn — an annual forerunner to COP deliberations. The BRICS statement is timed as a pre-COP31 position on both border carbon measures and the size of the adaptation-finance pledge.
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Practice Question — from the story
With reference to the European Union's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the joint statement of the 12th BRICS Environment Ministers' Meeting, consider the following statements:
- The EU's CBAM entered its definitive phase from January 1, 2026 and covers imports of iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen and electricity.
- The BRICS environment ministers, meeting in New Delhi under India's chairship, urged developed countries to meet the commitment agreed at the UN climate conference in 2025 to triple adaptation finance to developing countries by 2035.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: Both 1 and 2
- Statement 1: Correct. The EU's CBAM entered its definitive phase from January 1, 2026 and requires importers of iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, hydrogen and electricity to account for embedded carbon emissions.
- Statement 2: Correct. The BRICS statement urged developed countries to meet the commitment agreed at the 2025 UN climate conference to triple adaptation finance to developing countries by 2035.
Therefore, the correct answer is Both 1 and 2.
Concept check — test your understanding
In trade-policy terms, an importing country's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) on carbon-intensive imports such as steel is most accurately understood as which of the following?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: C
- CBAM prices the embedded emissions in each imported unit and requires the importer to surrender a certificate equivalent to that carbon content — economically identical to a variable tariff whose rate is set by emissions intensity, not by product category.
- Option A misdescribes CBAM as voluntary; the mechanism is a legal obligation on importers into the EU.
- Option B confuses a price instrument with a quantitative one; CBAM does not cap volumes, it prices carbon content.
- Option D reverses the direction: CBAM taxes imports, it does not subsidise domestic producers, though it aims to reduce the competitive disadvantage of domestic producers who already face internal carbon pricing.