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BusinessTrade PolicyInternational EconomicsWto ReformUnilateral Tariffs

BRICS declaration condemns unilateral tariffs, presses WTO reform

BRICS's New Delhi Declaration condemned unilateral tariffs and non-tariff measures as WTO-inconsistent, backed reform of the multilateral trading system and pushed to restore the WTO's paralysed appellate body.

What happened

The 11-member BRICS grouping on September 12 adopted the New Delhi Declaration 2026, raising 'serious concerns' about the rise of unilateral tariff and non-tariff measures that it said were distorting trade and inconsistent with World Trade Organisation (WTO) rules. Members condemned 'unilateral coercive measures' contrary to international law — including economic and secondary sanctions — and called for their elimination. The declaration also opposed carbon border adjustment mechanisms used unilaterally, and backed the immediate restoration of the WTO's two-tier binding dispute settlement mechanism and appointment of new Appellate Body members.

Context

The declaration follows more than a year of US-led tariff escalation on trading partners and comes as the WTO's Appellate Body has been non-functional since December 2019, its member appointments blocked by the US. Intra-BRICS trade remains thin. Think-tank GTRI estimates the bloc accounted for $5.7 trillion of the world's $26.3 trillion in exports in 2025 — a 21.6% share — but only 4.1% was trade within the group, dominated by China. India recorded the largest trade deficit among BRICS members at $226 billion.

Why it matters

The declaration positions BRICS — roughly a fifth of global exports — as a collective counterweight to unilateral trade restrictions. Its endorsement of Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatment and Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT) reaffirms the two foundations of the WTO order for developing economies: non-discrimination among trading partners, and a longer implementation runway for lower-income members. The push to restore the Appellate Body targets the WTO's most visible institutional failure — without a binding second tier, winning parties in trade disputes cannot enforce panel awards.

Impact for India

  • Indian exporters: A collective BRICS pushback strengthens India's negotiating leverage as it faces US secondary tariffs and the EU's carbon border adjustment on carbon-intensive exports.
  • MSMEs: The declaration endorsed studying a BRICS 'Invoice Discounting Mechanism' aimed at MSME working-capital access; India alone hosts 94.91 million MSMEs, 36% of the bloc's 266 million.
  • Payments and currency: Support for interoperable BRICS payment systems and settlement in local currencies chips away at dollar dependence in intra-bloc trade — without going as far as a common currency.
  • WTO strategy: New Delhi's push for policy space reflects its relatively low share in global trade with room to grow; a working dispute-settlement mechanism protects that space against arbitrary tariff moves.
  • NDB: Declaration asks the New Development Bank to expand local-currency lending and diversify its funding base, deepening a channel outside dollar-denominated multilateral finance.

Key data

BRICS share of world exports (2025, GTRI): 21.6%$5.7 trillion of $26.3 trillion
Intra-BRICS trade share: 4.1%
India's trade deficit among BRICS members: $226 billionLargest in the bloc
MSMEs across the 11 BRICS members: 266 millionIndia: 94.91 million (36%)
WTO Appellate Body non-functional since: December 2019US-blocked appointments

Concepts

Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) treatmentThe WTO principle that requires a member to extend to all other members any trade concession it grants to one — the cornerstone of non-discrimination.The declaration backs MFN as a 'foundational principle' at a time when the US is testing plurilateral, discriminatory carve-outs.
Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT)WTO provisions that give developing and least-developed countries longer transition periods and lighter obligations under trade rules.BRICS argues that EU carbon border adjustment ignores S&DT by imposing climate-linked tariffs without giving developing nations extra time to decarbonise.
WTO Appellate BodyThe second tier of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism; hears appeals against first-instance panel rulings and, when functional, produces binding decisions.It has had no serving members since December 2019 after the US blocked appointments, leaving panel rulings effectively unappealable and hence unenforceable.
Carbon Border AdjustmentA levy on imports of carbon-intensive goods calibrated to the carbon price already paid in the exporting country, aimed at preventing 'carbon leakage'.BRICS opposed carbon border adjustments used 'unilaterally, punitively, discriminatorily or protectionistically', targeting the EU's mechanism.

Theory lens

Multilateralism as a collective-action problem — small and dispersed countries gain more from a rules-based trading system than from bilateral bargaining with a hegemon, because rules bind the strongest to reciprocity. The New Delhi Declaration reads as a coalition-building move to keep the WTO's MFN and dispute-settlement architecture alive at a moment when the US is testing exit from both. BRICS is trying to defend the public good of open, rules-based trade by pooling voice.

Stakeholders

Gains: Emerging markets and developing economies (EMDEs)Common BRICS position on MFN and S&DT strengthens their WTO negotiating floor.
Gains: Indian MSMEsEndorsement of a BRICS Invoice Discounting Mechanism targets their working-capital gap in cross-border trade.
Gains: New Development BankDeclaration asks NDB to expand local-currency lending and diversify its funding base.
Pressure point: Users of unilateral tariffs and secondary sanctionsDeclaration explicitly condemns unilateral coercive measures as contrary to international law and calls for their elimination.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to the New Delhi Declaration 2026 adopted by BRICS, consider the following statements:

  1. The declaration announced the adoption of a common BRICS currency to replace the US dollar in intra-bloc trade settlement.
  2. The declaration called for the immediate restoration of the WTO's two-tier binding dispute settlement mechanism, whose Appellate Body has been non-functional since December 2019.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: 2 only

  • Statement 1: Incorrect. The declaration steered clear of a common BRICS currency; it backed the more incremental goal of settling trade in members' own local currencies and building interoperable BRICS payment systems.
  • Statement 2: Correct. The declaration advocated the immediate restoration of an accessible, effective, fully functioning two-tier binding WTO dispute settlement mechanism, whose Appellate Body has been non-functional since December 2019 after the US blocked appointments.

Therefore, the correct answer is 2 only.

Concept check — test your understanding

Under WTO rules, the Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) principle requires a member to extend to every other member any trade concession it grants to one. Why is this principle particularly valuable for smaller and developing-country trading partners?

  1. Because it authorises them to retaliate against high-tariff partners without needing prior WTO clearance.
  2. Because it exempts developing countries from tariff cuts they have committed to under WTO rounds.
  3. Because it stops larger trading partners from picking off smaller ones with bilateral, discriminatory deals — any concession granted must spread across all WTO members.
  4. Because it automatically converts every bilateral trade agreement into a multilateral one under WTO oversight.
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: C

  • MFN is the non-discrimination backbone of the WTO order: a smaller economy that could not extract a bilateral concession on its own still benefits when a bigger partner offers that concession to a third country.
  • A confuses MFN with authorised retaliation under the dispute-settlement mechanism — a different track.
  • B confuses MFN with Special and Differential Treatment (S&DT), which is what actually gives developing countries lighter obligations and longer transition periods.
  • D is a partial-truth overreach: MFN extends the tariff concession, but the underlying agreement itself stays bilateral rather than being 'converted' into a WTO-administered multilateral treaty.