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US probe into the EU carbon border tax could pass concessions to India

The US Trade Representative has opened an investigation into the EU's Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, taking public comments until November 9. Because India secured a forward most-favoured-nation clause on CBAM in its EU trade deal, flexibilities the EU concedes to the US would pass through to Indian exporters.

What happened

The United States Trade Representative began an investigation into the European Union's expansion of its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, and has sought public comments from American small businesses until November 9. The USTR said CBAM requires EU importers of covered products in aluminium, cement, electricity, fertiliser, hydrogen, and iron and steel to declare the embedded emissions of imported goods, so that an imported good bears a carbon price equivalent to what EU producers pay. Its specific objection is to the default values: "the EU adds a punitive mark-up that increases the overall values, in order to encourage the use of company-level data", and any company-level data must be verified by an EU-accredited third-party verifier.

Context

India had difficult negotiations with the EU on CBAM and the regulation is expected to affect a range of Indian metal exports. The EU kept CBAM out of the India-EU trade deal, but Indian negotiators secured a forward most-favoured-nation clause on it, which a senior government official said could let Indian industry receive the same concessions the EU has promised the US under their own trade agreement. In the EU-US joint statement of August last year the EU, noting US concerns about the treatment of American small and medium businesses under CBAM, committed to work on additional flexibilities in CBAM implementation alongside an agreed increase in the de minimis exception.

Why it matters

A most-favoured-nation clause converts someone else's negotiating success into your own entitlement, and that is the whole mechanism here. India could not get CBAM out of its trade deal with the EU, so it secured the next best thing: a forward MFN clause, under which any better treatment the EU grants another partner later flows to India automatically. The US is now applying pressure on the same regulation, and the process of seeking public comments is often the first step towards retaliation. So the practical route to Indian relief on CBAM may run through Washington rather than through New Delhi. The underlying exposure is real and measurable. Think tank Global Trade Research Initiative estimates CBAM will hurt Indian exports of iron, steel and aluminium products to the EU and will translate into a 20-35% tax on select imports into the EU. The reason Indian steel is so exposed is technological: emissions are highest for the blast furnace and basic oxygen furnace route, lower for gas-based direct reduced iron, and lowest for scrap-based electric arc furnaces, and Indian producers largely use the blast furnace route. The planned shift to scrap-based arc furnaces under the green steel initiative runs into a supply constraint — an ICRIER report found scrap at only 20% of India's steelmaking feedstock, held back by domestic availability of approximately 25 million metric tonnes a year, while Indian industry has told the government that the EU's curbs on steel scrap exports act as a non-tariff barrier given that the EU is the world's largest producer of scrap.

Impact for India

  • Metal exporters: CBAM is estimated to translate into a 20-35% tax on select imports into the EU, with iron, steel and aluminium products the exposed categories.
  • The forward MFN clause: concessions the EU grants the US under their trade agreement would pass through to Indian industry, which is the channel the USTR probe opens.
  • Steel technology: Indian producers largely use the blast furnace route, which carries the highest emissions, so their CBAM liability is structurally higher than for arc-furnace producers.
  • The scrap constraint: scrap is only 20% of India's steelmaking feedstock against domestic availability of approximately 25 million metric tonnes a year, and industry argues EU curbs on scrap exports compound CBAM as a non-tariff barrier.
  • Timing: comments to the USTR close on November 9, and the comment process is often the first step towards retaliation.

Key data

Estimated CBAM impact on select Indian exports: A 20-35% taxOn imports into the EU, per Global Trade Research Initiative
Deadline for comments to the USTR: November 9Sought from American small businesses
Scrap share of India's steelmaking feedstock: 20%Constrained by domestic availability of approximately 25 million metric tonnes annually
Sectors covered by CBAM: Aluminium, cement, electricity, fertiliser, hydrogen, and iron and steelImporters must declare the embedded emissions of goods in these categories

Concepts

Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM)An EU measure requiring importers of covered goods to declare the emissions embedded in them and pay a carbon price equivalent to what EU producers face, so that domestic climate policy is not undercut by imports.The US objection is to how the EU sets the default emissions values, not to the principle of charging for embedded emissions.
Forward most-favoured-nation clauseA treaty provision under which a party automatically receives any better treatment its counterparty later grants to a third country.India could not keep CBAM out of its EU deal, so this clause is how it captures concessions the EU makes to the US.
Embedded emissionsThe greenhouse gases released in producing a good, attributed to the good itself rather than to the place it is consumed.They are what CBAM taxes, which is why the production route — blast furnace against electric arc furnace — decides the liability.
Non-tariff barrierA measure other than a tariff that restricts trade, such as a standard, a licensing requirement or an export restriction.Indian industry argues the EU's curbs on steel scrap exports function as one, because they limit the input India needs to lower the emissions CBAM charges for.

Theory lens

Effective rate of protection — what matters to a producer is not the tariff on its output alone but the combined effect of measures on its output and its inputs. India's position is squeezed from both sides: CBAM raises the cost of selling steel into the EU, while EU restrictions on scrap exports raise the cost of the input that would reduce that CBAM liability. The two measures together bite harder than either would alone, which is why industry frames the pair rather than CBAM by itself.

Global context

The EU has already shown it will negotiate on CBAM implementation under pressure. In the EU-US joint statement of August last year it took note of US concerns about the treatment of American small and medium businesses, agreed an increase in the de minimis exception and committed to work on additional flexibilities. That is the precedent India's forward MFN clause is designed to capture, and the USTR investigation is an attempt to extract more of the same.

Stakeholders

Gains: Indian metal exporters to the EUAny CBAM flexibility the EU concedes to the US would reach them through the forward most-favoured-nation clause in the India-EU deal.
Gains: American small and medium businessesThe EU has already committed to work on additional flexibilities and an increased de minimis exception in response to US concerns about them.
Pressure point: Indian blast furnace steel producersTheir route carries the highest emissions of the three, so they face the largest embedded-emissions liability under CBAM.
Pressure point: India's green steel transitionScrap is only 20% of steelmaking feedstock, constrained by domestic availability of about 25 million metric tonnes a year, while the EU restricts scrap exports.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to the US investigation into the EU's carbon border mechanism and India's position, consider the following statements:

  1. India succeeded in having the carbon border mechanism excluded from the India-EU trade deal.
  2. India secured a forward most-favoured-nation clause, under which concessions the EU grants another partner would pass to Indian exporters.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: 2 only

  • Statement 1: Incorrect because the EU managed to keep the mechanism out of the India-EU trade deal — that is, India did not secure its exclusion from the regulation's application.
  • Statement 2: Correct, and it is why the US investigation matters for India: a senior government official said the clause could let Indian industry receive the same concessions the EU has promised the US.

Therefore, the correct answer is 2 only.

Concept check — test your understanding

Indian steel faces a higher carbon border liability than steel from some other countries. What explains the difference?

  1. Indian steel is exported in a less processed form, so more of its value is subject to the levy.
  2. India has no domestic carbon price to offset against the border charge, unlike every other exporter.
  3. The liability depends on embedded emissions, and Indian producers largely use the blast furnace route, which emits more than gas-based or scrap-based routes.
  4. Indian exports travel further, and transport emissions are included in the calculation.
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: C

  • The charge is levied on emissions embedded in production, and emissions are highest for blast furnace and basic oxygen furnace steel, lower for gas-based direct reduced iron and lowest for scrap-based electric arc furnaces. India's reliance on the first route is what drives the liability.
  • Option A would matter under a value-based tariff, but the mechanism charges emissions rather than value.
  • Option B points at a real issue — recognition of a domestic carbon price is a live negotiating question — but it is not the source of the differential between production routes.
  • Option D is a common assumption about border carbon measures; the mechanism as described covers emissions embedded in production, not shipping.