India diversified its oil suppliers but not its shipping routes
Around 65-70% of India's oil imports and 75-80% of its liquefied natural gas arrive on the west coast, alongside 60-65% of refining capacity, so even Russian barrels reach India through the same chokepoints. Shifting part of that flow to the Chennai-Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor would cut exposure, argue analysts, but the corridor still has no scheduled direct shipping service.
What happened
India has diversified its oil suppliers without diversifying its routes, argue Anurag Bisen and co-author in an analysis of the country's energy security. Russian crude is largely shipped from Baltic ports through the Suez Canal to western Indian ports, so supply that looks diversified by origin remains concentrated by passage. The Eastern Maritime Corridor between Chennai and Vladivostok, announced as operational in November 2024, would cut transit to a Russian port by one-third, with 24 days over 10,470 km at 10 knots against 36 days over the 16,070-km conventional route through the Suez.
Context
India is the world's third-largest energy consumer and second-largest energy importer, bringing in around one-third of its total energy supply. Oil imports run at approximately 240-250 million tonnes a year with import dependency of nearly 85-90%. LNG imports are about 26-27 million tonnes at roughly 50% dependency, and liquefied petroleum gas about 20-21 million tonnes at approximately 60%. Russia has supplied roughly 30-40% of India's oil imports since 2023, worth approximately $45.38 billion in 2025 at around 1.7 to 1.9 million barrels per day, peaking in July 2026 at about 50.8% of total imports, or 2.47 million barrels per day.
Why it matters
The exposure is geographic, not contractual. The west coast handles approximately 65-70% of oil imports, 75-80% of LNG and 55-60% of LPG, and the infrastructure reinforces it: nearly 60-65% of refining capacity and about 70-75% of LNG regasification capacity sit there. The Jamnagar and Vadinar refineries alone represent a third of India's total refining output. That makes the Arabian Sea, the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb the system's single points of failure. In 2024 around 94 million tonnes of Russian exports reached Indian ports via the Suez Canal, including 63 million tonnes of oil and petroleum products. Diverting part of that east would also expose the other half of the problem — the trade relationship is lopsided. India-Russia trade hit a record $68.7 billion in FY 2024-25, but Indian exports were merely $4.9 billion against about $63.8 billion coming the other way, so a corridor built for Russian cargo would sail back nearly empty.
Impact for India
- Energy security: concentrating 60-65% of refining capacity and 70-75% of regasification on one coast means a single chokepoint disruption reaches most of the import system at once.
- Freight costs: ocean freight through the Eastern Maritime Corridor is expected to be more than 50% cheaper than the Suez route, from the shorter distance and the absence of canal transit charges.
- The binding constraint: there is no direct scheduled liner service between major Indian ports and the Russian Far East, so containers route through third-party Asian ports such as Ningbo or Shanghai, with operators such as FESCO recording transit times of around 34 days.
- Trade balance: India-Russia trade reached $68.7 billion in FY 2024-25 with Indian exports at just $4.9 billion, so eastbound capacity has little to carry.
- Resources: the corridor would open access to the Russian Arctic, which holds 13% of the world's undiscovered conventional oil and 30% of its undiscovered natural gas, relevant to India's rare earth and mineral shortfalls.
Key data
Concepts
Theory lens
Network economics and the coordination problem — a route becomes cheap only once enough traffic uses it, but traffic will not commit until the route is reliable. The analysis names this directly: shipping companies will not launch a high-frequency service until volumes make it profitable, while exporters cannot commit volumes without predictable transit. The result is a stable but inferior equilibrium on the western route, which is the classic case for a coordinating push rather than for waiting on prices.
Global context
The corridor sits inside a wider Russian project. Moscow has folded the former Northern Sea Route into a Trans-Arctic Transport Corridor running from St Petersburg to Vladivostok, integrating sea, rail, road and inland waterways, with its Unified Deep-Water System carrying approximately 75% of Russia's internal cargo. India connects to both ends — via the International North-South Transport Corridor in the west and the Eastern Maritime Corridor in the east. China, Japan and South Korea also lie along the eastern route, and more than half of India's trade already passes through the South China Sea.
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Practice Question — from the story
With reference to India's energy import infrastructure and the Eastern Maritime Corridor, consider the following statements:
- Approximately 65-70% of India's oil imports are handled on the west coast, which also holds nearly 60-65% of refining capacity.
- The Eastern Maritime Corridor covers 10,470 km in about 24 days at 10 knots, against 16,070 km in 36 days on the conventional route through the Suez.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: Both 1 and 2
- Statement 1: Correct — the west coast handles approximately 65-70% of oil imports, 75-80% of LNG and 55-60% of LPG, with nearly 60-65% of refining capacity and about 70-75% of regasification capacity located there.
- Statement 2: Correct, and this is the one-third reduction in transit time that the corridor is expected to deliver relative to the Mumbai-St Petersburg route.
Therefore, the correct answer is Both 1 and 2.
Concept check — test your understanding
Shipping lines will not run a scheduled service on a route until cargo volumes justify it, while exporters will not commit cargo until schedules are predictable. What kind of problem is this?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: C
- Both sides would be better off at high volumes and reliable schedules, but neither can move first profitably, so the inferior equilibrium on the western route persists. That is a coordination failure, and it is why the usual remedy is a commitment that breaks the deadlock rather than waiting for prices.
- Option A would apply if one party acted on another's behalf under asymmetric incentives; here the two are independent counterparties.
- Option B is plausible for thin long-haul routes and may well be true of this one, but scale economics is not what the chicken-and-egg description identifies.
- Option D is a real mechanism in markets with hidden quality, yet the obstacle here is the absence of a service, not uncertainty about who would use it.