Punjab's 152% groundwater extraction is widening the gap between farmers
Punjab extracts groundwater at 152% of recharge, and as the water table falls the cost of reaching it transfers wealth from small farmers to large ones.
What happened
Punjab's groundwater extraction rate was 152% in the 2025-26 Dynamic Groundwater Assessment, and 72% of its 153 blocks sit in the 'red zone', the highest share among States. Irrigation for rice and wheat is the principal consumer, at nearly 25 billion cubic metres a year on the latest estimate. The share of observation wells with water below 40 metres after the monsoon rose by two percentage points between 2022 and 2025. Interventions did cut the number of 'over-exploited' blocks by five across the last two assessments.
Context
What began as a push for food security settled into a concentrated rice-wheat system. Assured procurement, subsidised electricity and access to groundwater together made high-yield varieties, intensive irrigation, heavy fertiliser use and mechanisation less risky than any alternative. Farmers have stayed with that combination partly because switching is uncertain: storage options, prices, processing infrastructure and supply chains for other crops remain thin, and that gap has gone largely unaddressed. State governments have kept trying to curb demand, but the scale of extraction keeps overwhelming the efficiency gains those efforts produce.
Why it matters
Depletion is not just an environmental problem here; it is a mechanism that redistributes wealth. A study in the Economic and Political Weekly found that farmers with marginal landholdings use water more efficiently, while wealthier farmers are better equipped both to reach lower water tables and to draw higher volumes. As the table falls, farmers who cannot afford the deeper tube wells are forced to buy water, transferring wealth to larger landowners and creating unregulated dependencies. A separate study in Discover Sustainability, by two members of the same team, reported that in Sangrur and Barnala larger farms earned higher returns yet recorded lower groundwater productivity for paddy than smaller farms. The pattern is consistent: falling water tables raise the capital needed to irrigate, and that systematically favours whoever has better access to finance.
Impact for India
- Smallholders and marginal farmers: Squeezed hardest. They irrigate more efficiently but cannot finance the deeper wells, so they end up buying water from neighbours.
- Large landowners: Gain twice. They can reach lower tables, draw higher volumes, and sell water to those who cannot.
- Tenant cultivators: Currently outside the benefit stream, because support attaches to owners of land or pumps rather than to whoever actually farms.
- State finances: The electricity subsidy bill is both the cost of the problem and the possible source of its remedy, if part of it is redirected to smallholder support.
- Cropping pattern: Diversification stays stalled while storage, prices, processing and supply chains for non-paddy crops remain uncertain.
- Water-use efficiency schemes: 'Pani Bachao, Paisa Kamao' pays farmers for every unused kilowatt-hour of pumping below a threshold and looks promising, but enrolment is low.
Key data
Concepts
Theory lens
Common pool resources — a resource that is rival in consumption but from which users cannot easily be excluded gets drawn down past the socially efficient point, because each user bears only a small fraction of the cost their extraction imposes on everyone else. Punjab's aquifer is the textbook case: at a 152% extraction rate, every additional tube well lowers the table for neighbouring farms. The editorial sharpens the standard model by showing who absorbs that external cost, since it lands on farmers who cannot finance a deeper well.
Historical parallel
The crisis grew out of a policy that worked. A food-security strategy built around assured procurement, subsidised power and accessible groundwater made high-yield varieties and intensive irrigation the least risky choice available to Punjab's farmers, and it delivered the output it was designed to deliver. The same incentives then hardened into a rice-wheat monoculture that the State is now trying to unwind. It is a familiar sequence in agricultural policy: an instrument aimed at one target becomes the reason a second problem cannot be fixed.
Stakeholders
Practice Question — from the story
With reference to groundwater exploitation in Punjab, consider the following statements:
- Punjab's groundwater extraction rate was 72% according to the 2025-26 Dynamic Groundwater Assessment.
- A study in the Economic and Political Weekly found that farmers with marginal landholdings use groundwater less efficiently than wealthier farmers.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: Neither 1 nor 2
- Statement 1: Incorrect because the extraction rate was 152%. The figure of 72% refers to the share of Punjab's 153 blocks that sit in the 'red zone', which is the highest among States.
- Statement 2: Incorrect because the direction is reversed. The study found that farmers with marginal landholdings use water more efficiently, while wealthier farmers are better equipped to reach lower water tables and draw higher volumes.
Therefore, the correct answer is Neither 1 nor 2.
Concept check — test your understanding
Subsidised electricity for pumping is treated as a driver of groundwater depletion. Which mechanism best explains how the subsidy produces over-extraction?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: C
- A user extracts up to the point where their private marginal cost meets their private marginal benefit; when power is nearly free, that private cost is close to zero while the cost borne by neighbours through a falling table is not, so extraction runs well past the socially efficient level.
- Option A is misleading because the income effect is real but secondary; the subsidy bites mainly by changing the relative price of pumping, not the farm's overall budget.
- Option B is misleading because the subsidy cuts the running cost of a pump rather than the capital cost of boring the well, and it is precisely the capital cost of a deeper well that smaller farmers cannot meet.
- Option D is misleading because it describes assured procurement, a genuinely separate driver of the same cropping pattern, rather than the mechanism through which cheap power drives extraction.