India to flag China's tech import and investment curbs at BRICS Summit
Ahead of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12-13, the Commerce Ministry has consulted Indian industry and is expected to press Beijing on Chinese customs curbs on high-tech items and on investment restrictions facing Indian firms in China.
What happened
Ahead of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12-13, which Chinese President Xi Jinping is expected to attend with a sizeable business delegation, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry has consulted Indian industry groups and is likely to flag two sets of concerns in high-level talks with China on the sidelines: investment restrictions facing Indian companies in China, and Chinese customs curbs on the import of high-tech items into India. Industry executives cite Chinese export restrictions imposed over the past 12-15 months on ingot and wafer technology, battery cells and cell technology, and High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) transmission equipment, alongside delayed rare-earth magnet exports that have forced Indian carmakers into workarounds.
Context
The talks come during a broader thaw in India-China economic ties. India's exports to China jumped over 28% to $5.55 billion in April-June this financial year, cushioning fishery exports hit by US tariffs. The two governments have also eased FDI curbs on land-bordering countries, reopened border trade via Nathu La and resumed direct flights. In March this year, BHEL was allowed to procure 21 critical items from China for five years. In June, four Chinese power equipment manufacturers with Indian factories — TBEA Energy, Nanjing Electric India, New Northeast Electric India and Taikai Electric (India) — were exempted from public procurement rules that require entities from land-bordering countries to register before bidding. Chinese Ambassador Xu Feihong met Commerce Secretary Rajesh Agrawal on September 1.
Why it matters
India's manufacturing build-out — renewables, power transmission, EVs — leans hard on components where China dominates the upstream. Restrictions on HVDC exports matter directly for a grid programme designed to move renewable power over long distances; restrictions on ingots, wafers and battery cells hit solar and storage manufacturing at exactly the point of the value chain India is trying to move upstream into. If the Summit talks yield even partial reciprocity — Indian firms getting steadier access to Chinese inputs in return for continued easing on the investment side — the return on India's PLI-led industrial strategy improves. If they do not, the strategic vulnerability of relying on a single upstream supplier for the next round of capacity build-out becomes harder to hedge.
Impact for India
- Renewable and grid manufacturers: Direct exposure — Chinese curbs on ingot and wafer technology, battery cells and HVDC equipment cut into precisely the value-chain layers India's transmission and solar build-out depends on.
- Automotive industry: Continued delays in rare-earth magnet exports from China force workarounds and add cost pressure to EV and permanent-magnet motor supply chains.
- Commerce Ministry: The Summit is a channel to convert routine ambassadorial meetings — Xu Feihong met Rajesh Agrawal on September 1 — into a concrete reciprocity package on customs procedures and investment access.
- Chinese power equipment firms with Indian factories: The June exemption for TBEA Energy, Nanjing Electric India, New Northeast Electric India and Taikai Electric (India) has already opened government tenders to them; the Summit context will shape whether that access broadens or holds.
- India-China diplomatic-economic linkage: The postponement of a top Commerce Ministry visit to Beijing this week, due to border-related talks, illustrates how tightly the trade relationship remains tied to the LAC situation.
Key data
Concepts
Theory lens
Strategic-trade theory — when a small number of large suppliers dominate the world market for a critical input, an importing country's manufacturers face bargaining power that is not competed away and can be turned into an instrument of pressure. India's renewables, EV and grid programmes are running exactly into that structure with China as the dominant supplier of ingots, wafers, battery cells, rare-earth magnets and HVDC gear, which is why the current Summit conversation is being framed less as a market-access negotiation and more as a strategic-vulnerability review.
Stakeholders
Practice Question — from the story
With reference to recent developments in India-China economic ties, consider the following statements:
- India pulled out of the China-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations in 2020, in the aftermath of the Galwan valley clash along the Line of Actual Control.
- The Finance Ministry has exempted four Chinese power equipment manufacturers with factories in India — TBEA Energy, Nanjing Electric India, New Northeast Electric India and Taikai Electric (India) — from the provisions of the public procurement rules that require entities from countries sharing a land border with India to register before bidding for government contracts.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: 2 only
- Statement 1: Incorrect. India pulled out of RCEP in 2019, before the June 2020 Galwan valley clash. The public procurement and FDI restrictions on land-bordering countries were introduced later, in 2020, in the aftermath of that clash.
- Statement 2: Correct. In June, the Finance Ministry exempted TBEA Energy, Nanjing Electric India, New Northeast Electric India and Taikai Electric (India) from the public procurement registration requirement for entities from land-bordering countries.
Therefore, the correct answer is 2 only.
Concept check — test your understanding
In industrial policy, an Indian firm that decides to start manufacturing the wafers, cells and other intermediate inputs it currently imports from Chinese suppliers is undertaking which of the following?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: D
- Backward integration is a move up the value chain to make the inputs a firm currently buys, which is exactly what the story's executive means by 'our entire backward integration' being at risk from Chinese export curbs on ingots, wafers and cells.
- Option A describes horizontal integration — expansion at the same stage of the value chain by acquiring or building capacity in the same final product.
- Option B describes product diversification into unrelated lines, not a move along the same value chain.
- Option C is contract manufacturing, where a firm produces for another company's specifications — the opposite of internalising input production.