Live on XaptiqUGC NET Economics (Dec 2026) and IIT JAM Economics (EN) test series are now live on Xaptiq.View test series
ExplainedInternational EconomicsBalance of PaymentsExchange RateGlobal Imbalances

As India hosts the BRICS summit, the agenda should be reform, not confrontation

Ahead of the 18th BRICS summit in New Delhi on September 12-13, an Indian Express analysis argues India should push a reform-and-cooperation agenda — local-currency payments, NDB, digital public infrastructure — rather than the anti-West posture favoured by China and Russia, since the grouping now covers 36.8% of global GDP on PPP.

What happened

India will host the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on September 12 and 13, marking 20 years since the grouping was formalised in 2006, argue Anurag Bisen (Vivekananda International Foundation) and Raj Kumar Sharma (SDU University, Almaty) in Indian Express. Since 2000, when BRIC accounted for roughly 23% of global GDP on a purchasing power parity basis versus the G7's 52%, the positions have reversed: by 2024 the expanded 11-member BRICS accounted for approximately 36.8% of global GDP (PPP), while the G7's share fell below 29%. The 11th member, Indonesia, joined in January 2025.

Context

Intra-BRICS merchandise trade reached $1.17 trillion in 2024, a nearly 13-fold increase from $84 billion two decades earlier, and the bloc holds an estimated $5.2 trillion in combined foreign reserves and accounts for 78.2% of global mineral coal production. BRICS nations are projected to grow at 3.8% in 2025 and 3.7% in 2026, more than three times the G7 average, though per-capita GDP tells a different story — G7 averages around $53,000 versus roughly $8,200 for BRICS. The New Development Bank, which India proposed at the 2012 New Delhi summit, had approved approximately $44 billion across 141 projects by mid-2026.

Why it matters

The authors argue the summit's central choice is whether BRICS becomes a reform-oriented economic grouping (the Indian-Brazilian view) or a geopolitical counterweight to the West (the Chinese-Russian view). India's revealed preference has been transactional: it refused Russia's 2023 demand to pay for oil in yuan, insisting on dollars or rupees only, and in February 2026 signed a framework trade agreement with the United States in which it reportedly agreed to halt Russian oil purchases in exchange for reduced tariffs. That trajectory — plus the failure of the May 2026 BRICS Foreign Ministers' meeting in New Delhi to agree on a joint declaration over Iran-UAE differences — pushes India towards a practical, low-friction agenda.

Impact for India

  • India's payments architecture: BRICS Pay is set to be unveiled at the September summit, linking Russia's SPFS, China's CIPS, India's UPI and Brazil's Pix — a route to settle trade outside dollar correspondent banks.
  • Rupee internationalisation: rupee-dirham local currency settlement (July 2023) and rupee-rupiah settlement (July 2026) already show traction — India-Indonesia LCS trade surged 163% YoY to $8.45 billion in the first two months of 2026.
  • Development finance: continued NDB scale-up — $44 billion approved across 141 projects — provides an alternative to World Bank / ADB financing that India can shape.
  • Trade policy: India's Feb 2026 US framework agreement (halting Russian oil for tariff relief) shows the grouping is not a binding external constraint on Indian trade choices.
  • Reserve currency mix: even as bilateral settlement grows, the dollar still accounts for 57.13% of global central bank reserves (Q1 2026); the authors warn no BRICS member is accumulating rupee, yuan or rand reserves at meaningful scale.

Key data

BRICS share of global GDP (PPP): Approximately 36.8% in 2024Up from ~23% for BRIC in 2000G7 fell below 29% from ~52% in 2000
Intra-BRICS merchandise trade: $1.17 trillion in 2024Nearly 13-fold riseFrom $84 billion two decades earlier
New Development Bank book: Approximately $44 billion approvedAcross 141 projects by mid-2026India proposed NDB at the 2012 New Delhi summit
India-Indonesia local-currency trade: $8.45 billion in Jan-Feb 2026Up 163% year-on-yearRupee-rupiah settlement operationalised July 2026
US dollar in global CB reserves: 57.13% in Q1 2026Still dominantNo BRICS member accumulating rupee, yuan or rand reserves at meaningful scale

Concepts

Local Currency Settlement (LCS)A bilateral arrangement in which two central banks let their firms invoice and settle trade in each other's home currency, avoiding a third-country reserve currency.The India-UAE rupee-dirham LCS (July 2023) and the India-Indonesia rupee-rupiah LCS (July 2026) are the operative examples the authors cite.
Special Rupee Vostro Account (SRVA)A rupee account opened with an Indian bank by a partner-country bank, authorised by the RBI, that lets trade be invoiced and settled directly in rupees.SRVAs channel about 90% of India-Russia direct payments into national currencies.
De-dollarisation (bilateral track)The shift of cross-border settlement away from the US dollar towards national currencies or interoperable central-bank digital currencies.BRICS Pay — linking SPFS, CIPS, UPI and Pix — represents de-dollarisation through the back door rather than a single BRICS currency.
Multi-alignmentA foreign-economic-policy stance in which a country participates simultaneously in multiple non-exclusive groupings to preserve strategic autonomy.India's simultaneous membership of BRICS, the G20, the Quad and the SCO — plus its Feb 2026 US framework trade agreement — is presented as a working example.

Theory lens

Economic-integration theory (Balassa, Viner) — regional groupings move along a spectrum from preferential trade to customs union, common market and monetary union; the deeper the stage, the greater the sovereignty cost to members. Applied to BRICS, the article's argument is that the grouping is deliberately staying at the shallow end — bilateral local-currency settlement, interoperable payment rails, a development bank — because members with divergent geopolitical alignments cannot bear the trade-creation-versus-diversion costs of a currency or a customs union.

Global context

The scale asymmetry sharpens the point: BRICS-11 now covers 36.8% of world GDP on PPP against the G7's below-29%, and it holds $5.2 trillion in foreign reserves, but per-capita GDP is roughly $8,200 versus $53,000 in the G7. The authors argue this makes BRICS a bloc powered by aggregate scale, not individual prosperity — a very different lever than the OECD's income-weighted standard-setting.

Stakeholders

Gains: India (agenda-setting)Hosting the 18th summit lets New Delhi anchor priorities on NDB scale-up, BRICS Pay interoperability and digital public infrastructure.
Gains: New Development BankA visible reform-oriented agenda strengthens the pipeline behind the $44 billion / 141-project book.
Gains: Indian exporters to UAE / IndonesiaRupee-dirham (since July 2023) and rupee-rupiah (July 2026) settlement lowers dollar-clearance costs — LCS trade with Indonesia rose 163% YoY to $8.45 billion in Jan-Feb 2026.
Pressure point: Proponents of a common BRICS currencyUS President Donald Trump's 100% tariff threat has largely shelved a single BRICS currency; the fallback is bilateral local-currency settlement.
Pressure point: BRICS consensus disciplineThe May 2026 Foreign Ministers' meeting in New Delhi failed to agree on a joint declaration — the first such failure — as Iran and UAE stood on opposite sides of an active conflict.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to BRICS in 2026, consider the following statements:

  1. The New Development Bank (NDB), proposed by India at the 2012 New Delhi BRICS Summit, had approved approximately $44 billion across 141 projects by mid-2026.
  2. Indonesia became the 11th full member of BRICS in January 2024.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: 1 only

  • Statement 1: Correct — the NDB, proposed by India at the 2012 New Delhi summit, had approved approximately $44 billion across 141 projects by mid-2026.
  • Statement 2: Incorrect — Indonesia became the 11th full member in January 2025, not 2024. In 2024 the grouping added Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Therefore, the correct answer is 1 only.

Concept check — test your understanding

As described in the article, India's preferred de-dollarisation strategy within BRICS is best characterised as:

  1. Creating a single supranational BRICS currency backed by the bloc's combined foreign reserves.
  2. Bilateral local-currency settlement combined with interoperable central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), building on the domestic UPI model.
  3. Adopting the Chinese yuan as the invoicing currency for intra-BRICS oil and merchandise trade.
  4. Pegging the rupee to a basket of the other ten BRICS members' currencies.
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: B

  • Correct: India has favoured a decentralised approach — rupee-dirham and rupee-rupiah local currency settlement, Special Rupee Vostro Accounts, and interoperable CBDCs — reflecting the design philosophy behind UPI rather than a single bloc currency.
  • Distractor A is the option BRICS has largely shelved: Trump's 100% tariff threat cooled the single-currency idea, and India was never its principal backer.
  • Distractor C flips India's revealed preference: in 2023 India refused Russia's demand to pay for oil in yuan, insisting on dollars or rupees only.
  • Distractor D describes a basket peg — a real exchange-rate regime used elsewhere, but not part of India's stance; India runs a managed-float regime and has not proposed pegging the rupee to any BRICS basket.