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NationalPublic FinancePublic ExpenditureSubsidiesWelfare Economics

Cash transfers to women carry a political cost, not just a fiscal one

Unconditional cash transfer schemes to women have become a signature electoral strategy since 2020, yet targeting errors — real and perceived — impose a distinct political cost that has coincided with incumbent losses, argue K. R. Shanmugam and Sankarganesh Karuppiah.

What happened

Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT) schemes have become a central electoral strategy in India since 2020, particularly to attract women voters, yet several sponsoring governments have lost office despite raising the payouts before the 2026 elections, argue K. R. Shanmugam of the Madras School of Economics and Sankarganesh Karuppiah of the Indian Revenue Service. Writing in The Hindu, they cite the Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam in Tamil Nadu, Lakshmir Bhandar in West Bengal, Gruha Lakshmi Yojana in Karnataka and Mukhya Majhi Ladki Bahin Yojana in Maharashtra, and estimate — citing the Ministry of Finance's latest Economic Survey — that States are expected to spend about $18 billion on UCTs in 2025-26.

Context

The Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam illustrates the design tension. The ruling party promised ₹1,000 per month to all women-headed households before the 2021 election, but fiscal constraints led the government to restrict eligibility by income, land ownership and other criteria when the scheme launched in September 2023. It initially covered about 1.13 crore women, with another 16.94 lakh beneficiaries added in December 2025 after widespread complaints. The scheme cost ₹13,807 crore in 2025-26. Lakshmir Bhandar (2021) faced allegations of covering non-residential citizens; expansion did not prevent the incumbent's defeat.

Why it matters

The authors describe an inherent tension between economics and politics. Economics favours targeted programmes so scarce public resources reach those most in need; politics rewards broad inclusion because voters judge governments both by what they receive and by what they believe was unfairly denied. Because most informal-sector incomes cannot be observed, governments use proxies — land, electricity use, household assets — that generate both inclusion and exclusion errors. The economic cost of targeting is well-studied; the argument here is that the political cost is being systematically under-priced.

Impact for India

  • State finances: rising UCT bills crowd out productive spending on employment and self-employment programmes and require expenditure switching or wider fiscal deficits.
  • Sponsor parties: even accurate targeting produces aggrieved excluded voters, so competitive welfarism becomes politically self-defeating over time.
  • Beneficiaries: once households come to depend on a UCT, withdrawal is politically difficult — locking in a recurring liability.
  • Alternative programme design: conditional cash transfers and self-selecting schemes such as Tamil Nadu's Midday Meal reduce grievance because participation is tied to a socially desirable behaviour like school enrolment.
  • SDG frame: UCTs partially advance SDG 5.4 by recognising women's unpaid domestic and care work, but that gain sits alongside the fiscal and political costs.

Key data

States' expected UCT spend, 2025-26: About $18 billionTargeted mostly at womenMinistry of Finance, latest Economic Survey
Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam — monthly payout: ₹1,000 per monthPromised to women-headed households (2021)Eligibility restricted when scheme launched in September 2023
Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam — cost: ₹13,807 crore in 2025-26Beneficiaries expanded from 1.13 croreAnother 16.94 lakh added in December 2025

Concepts

Unconditional Cash Transfer (UCT)A direct cash payment to a defined beneficiary group without any behavioural condition (schooling, work, health check-ups) attached.State-level UCT schemes to women — Lakshmir Bhandar, Gruha Lakshmi, Kalaignar Magalir Urimai — are the archetype the authors evaluate.
Targeting errorFailure of a means-tested programme to match beneficiaries to eligibility — inclusion error (ineligible households included) or exclusion error (eligible households left out).Because informal-sector incomes are unobservable, governments use proxies such as land, electricity or assets, which produce both kinds of error.
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)A cash transfer paid only when the beneficiary undertakes a specified action, typically school attendance, immunisation or work.The authors argue CCTs — of which Tamil Nadu's Midday Meal is a longstanding in-kind analogue — carry lower political risk because self-selection reduces grievance.
Competitive welfarismPolitical-economy dynamic in which rival parties escalate transfers to the same beneficiary group as an electoral commitment.The authors flag it as the reason UCTs are hard to withdraw once households come to depend on them.

Theory lens

Political-economy of redistribution — public choice theory notes that voters evaluate governments not only on benefits received but also on benefits they believe were unfairly denied, so any means-tested transfer with imperfect observability generates a political-cost residual. The authors apply this to UCTs: even administratively accurate targeting produces excluded voters who see the denial as unfair, and the marginal shift in constituencies where 2021-launched schemes were expanded pre-2026 illustrates the mechanism.

Stakeholders

Gains: Women beneficiariesDirect cash strengthens autonomy and partially compensates unpaid care work per SDG 5.4.
Gains: Conditional-transfer / in-kind programmesAuthors argue schemes tied to schooling or work (e.g. Midday Meal) face lower political risk and better developmental returns.
Pressure point: State exchequersFinancing UCTs requires expenditure switching or larger fiscal deficits, squeezing productive investment.
Pressure point: Excluded eligible womenProxy-based means testing generates exclusion errors — grievance that can shift votes in close constituencies.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to unconditional cash transfer (UCT) schemes for women in India, consider the following statements:

  1. The Kalaignar Magalir Urimai Thittam was launched in September 2023 with monthly transfers of ₹1,000 to all women-headed households without any means test.
  2. The Ministry of Finance's latest Economic Survey expects States to spend about $18 billion on unconditional cash transfers in 2025-26.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: 2 only

  • Statement 1: Incorrect — the ₹1,000-a-month payout was a 2021 pre-election promise for all women-headed households, but when the scheme launched in September 2023 fiscal constraints forced the government to restrict eligibility by income, land ownership and other criteria.
  • Statement 2: Correct — the authors cite the Ministry of Finance's latest Economic Survey estimating that States will spend about $18 billion on UCTs in 2025-26, much of it targeted at women.

Therefore, the correct answer is 2 only.

Concept check — test your understanding

In the Indian context, why do targeted, means-tested unconditional cash transfer schemes typically generate both inclusion and exclusion errors?

  1. Because informal-sector workers systematically over-report income in official surveys, causing eligible women to be classified as ineligible.
  2. Because state governments are prohibited by the Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act from means-testing welfare schemes.
  3. Because most workers are in the informal sector and their incomes cannot be directly observed, forcing governments to rely on imperfect proxies such as land ownership or electricity consumption.
  4. Because inclusion and exclusion errors are entirely the result of administrative corruption and would vanish under fully digital direct benefit transfers.
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: C

  • Correct: informal-sector income is unobservable, so eligibility is inferred from proxy variables (land, electricity, household assets) that map imperfectly to actual income — producing both false positives (inclusion errors) and false negatives (exclusion errors).
  • Distractor A inverts the well-known incentive: informal workers typically under-report, not over-report, income when a benefit is at stake.
  • Distractor B misapplies the FRBM Act, which caps fiscal deficits but has nothing to say about the design of welfare eligibility.
  • Distractor D describes a common misconception: even a corruption-free, fully digital transfer would still suffer targeting errors because the underlying income data is missing, not merely misrecorded.