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EconomyPayments > Digital PaymentsMonetary EconomicsDigital PaymentsUpi

Cash with the public grows 13% as UPI value growth slows to 18.7%

Cash with the public rose about 13% year-on-year to Rs 41.8 lakh crore by July 31, 2026, while UPI transaction value growth has slowed to 18.7% in 2026-27 — narrowing the gap between cash and digital just as Parliament clears an enabling law to allow a merchant discount rate on UPI.

What happened

The Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, passed in the Monsoon session of Parliament, enables the government to levy a Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) — a per-transaction charge merchants pay for accepting digital payments — on UPI and RuPay debit card transactions that are currently free. An analysis of Reserve Bank of India data by The Hindu shows the growth rate of cash with the public — currency in circulation minus cash sitting in banks — has accelerated from about 4% in 2023-24 to 12% in 2025-26 and roughly 13% year-on-year in 2026-27 through July. UPI value growth has slowed from 133% in 2019-20 to 18.7% in April-August 2026.

Context

UPI was rolled out as a zero-charge public digital payments rail; RuPay debit card transactions were kept free to broaden card acceptance. India Stack's payments layer is one of the most-cited examples of financial inclusion through public digital infrastructure. Cash-with-public growth had cooled steadily from a 17% pandemic-year peak in 2020-21 through 2023-24, which policy makers took as evidence that digital payments were displacing currency. That reading is now under stress: cash growth has been quickening for two consecutive years even as UPI's own growth curve flattens.

Why it matters

Two policy debates collide in one dataset. On payments, if Parliament allows an MDR on UPI, merchants who bear the charge are likely to pass it on — the Opposition warns this could push consumers back to cash and undo years of currency displacement. On measurement, if both cash and digital rails are growing while headline retail inflation stays modest, either the economy is genuinely running hot on real activity or reported prices are undercounting the pressure. Pronab Sen, former Chief Statistician of India, argued the parallel expansion in cash and UPI 'would imply that we are undercounting inflation, because that's where this should show up.'

Impact for India

  • Merchants above whatever MDR threshold is finally notified will face a per-transaction cost on UPI acceptance that they can pass on as higher prices.
  • Consumers face a tacit incentive to shift back to cash for high-value payments if the pass-through happens, blunting a decade of digital payments push.
  • Government revenue from MDR is a new lever, but it works against the currency-displacement objective that made UPI a public good in the first place.
  • The Statistics Ministry faces a fresh question on whether the CPI basket and weights are picking up the price pressure implied by simultaneous cash and UPI growth — retail inflation for July 2026 stood at 4.45% and wholesale at 9.8%.
  • The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), which manages currency in circulation, sees quickening cash demand feed into its liquidity operations even as digital payments infrastructure continues to expand.

Key data

Cash with the public (level): Rs 41.8 lakh croreNearly 13% higher YoYAs of July 31, 2026
Cash-with-public growth trajectory: 17% (2020-21) -> 4% (2023-24) -> 6.5% (2024-25) -> 12% (2025-26)
UPI value growth: 133% (2019-20) -> 95% (2020-21) -> 105% (2021-22) -> 20.3% (2025-26) -> 18.7% (Apr-Aug 2026-27)
CPI retail inflation, July 2026: 4.45%Slightly higher than June
WPI wholesale inflation: 9.8% (July 2026)Down marginally from 9.9% in June

Concepts

Merchant Discount Rate (MDR)A per-transaction fee that a merchant pays to its acquiring bank or payment service provider for accepting a card or digital payment, typically split between the acquirer, issuer and network.The Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 enables the government to end the zero-MDR regime on UPI and RuPay debit card transactions for some categories.
Cash with the publicCurrency in circulation held outside the banking system — total notes and coins issued minus cash held with banks.The Hindu's series uses this RBI measure as the cleanest proxy for currency actively used in transactions.
Currency-to-GDP ratio (implied)The stock of currency in circulation relative to nominal GDP; a rising ratio suggests either higher informal activity, higher precautionary demand for cash, or lagging digital displacement.Cash growth outpacing formal-sector expectations is what raises the currency-displacement question the story flags.
Digital public infrastructure (DPI)Population-scale digital rails — identity, payments, data — provided as a public good on which private and public services build applications.UPI is the payments layer of India Stack, and pricing it now is a live debate about whether DPI stays free at the point of use.

Theory lens

Payments as a two-sided market with a public option — Rochet-Tirole style analysis argues card and digital-payment networks need cross-subsidies between the merchant side and the consumer side to reach scale, and the fee split (interchange, MDR) shapes which side under-adopts. UPI's zero-MDR design forced a public subsidy on the acquirer economics to keep both sides on the platform. Allowing MDR reopens that split: pricing merchants above a threshold shifts network cost to the merchant side, which classical two-sided market results predict will get partially passed on to consumer prices, weakening the network effect that made UPI's growth curve possible.

Stakeholders

Gains: Central government (fiscal side)New revenue line if MDR is notified on UPI beyond a threshold
Gains: Payment aggregators and banksMDR flow historically funds acquirer economics and reward programmes
Pressure point: High-value merchants above the MDR thresholdPer-transaction charge on UPI acceptance they will seek to pass on
Pressure point: Consumers of those merchantsLikely higher final prices if merchants pass the MDR on, as the Opposition has argued

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to UPI transactions and cash usage in India (as of August 2026), consider the following statements:

  1. UPI value growth in 2026-27 (April-August) has risen to 20.3%, exceeding its 2025-26 growth rate.
  2. The Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, passed in the Monsoon session of Parliament, enables the government to allow a Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) to be levied on UPI and RuPay debit card transactions.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: 2 only

  • Statement 1: Incorrect. UPI value growth has slowed from 20.3% in 2025-26 to 18.7% in April-August 2026-27 — the direction is a slowdown, not an acceleration.
  • Statement 2: Correct. The Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, passed in the Monsoon session, enables the government to end the zero-MDR regime on UPI and RuPay debit card transactions.

Therefore, the correct answer is 2 only.

Concept check — test your understanding

In the economics of two-sided payments platforms, what is the primary rationale for governments choosing to keep a retail rail like UPI at zero merchant discount rate (MDR) rather than pricing it the way a private card scheme does?

  1. To match global central bank practice, since most peer central banks operate their retail payment rails at cost.
  2. To eliminate inter-bank settlement risk by shifting it fully onto the public infrastructure operator.
  3. To subsidise the merchant side of the network so that both merchants and consumers reach the critical mass at which digital acceptance becomes self-sustaining.
  4. To pre-empt entry by private wallets by ensuring regulatory costs are uniform across all payment intermediaries.
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: C

  • A two-sided platform succeeds only when both sides join at scale; whichever side has weaker willingness to pay must be subsidised (usually via a lower fee). Zero-MDR pushes UPI's cost off the merchant side, encouraging acceptance and letting consumer usage build the network effect.
  • Option A is factually wrong: most peer retail card systems around the world do charge an MDR; UPI's zero-MDR model is unusual, not the norm.
  • Option B mixes up pricing with settlement risk, which is a separate NPCI-plus-central-bank question and is not resolved by charging or not charging MDR.
  • Option D confuses competitive-neutrality regulation with pricing; zero-MDR does not standardise entry costs across wallets and networks — it removes a specific per-transaction fee.