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EconomyDigital Payments > RegulationIndian EconomyDigital PaymentsUpi Mdr

Government lays groundwork for a charge on large-merchant UPI payments

Parliament has amended the Payment and Settlement Systems Act to let the government notify UPI transactions that can attract a Merchant Discount Rate; sources say a charge would apply only to large-merchant transactions above ₹2,000, leaving over 95% of UPI payments free.

What happened

The Lok Sabha this week passed the Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 without a debate. It amends the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 to let the Centre notify UPI and RuPay debit-card transactions that can attract a charge — until now these were expressly exempt. No fee has been notified yet. Government sources say a Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) would apply only to transactions by merchants with turnover above ₹1 crore-₹1.5 crore and only for payments above ₹2,000 — about 5% of UPI transactions by count, but roughly two-thirds by value. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman said any MDR would fall on merchants, not end-users, and would fund infrastructure, innovation and security.

Context

UPI was made free for consumers and merchants in 2020, and industry players have since carried the cost of running the rails. In 2021 the Centre began a subsidy scheme to partially reimburse banks and payment processors for handling low-value P2M UPI and RuPay transactions up to ₹2,000 for small merchants; the incentive is capped at 0.15% of transaction value. About ₹8,730 crore was paid out under this scheme over 2021-22 to 2024-25, with a further ₹2,000 crore budgeted for 2026-27. UPI volumes have crossed 24,000 crore transactions worth ₹314 lakh crore in 2025-26, and industry annual costs are around ₹15,000 crore.

Why it matters

This is a classic infrastructure-financing choice. UPI has scaled into a public digital utility, but its running costs sit on private banks and payment companies. The three options — taxpayer subsidy, RBI-funded development from its surplus, or a merchant fee — have very different distributional consequences. A merchant fee limited to large-ticket transactions borrows from the two-part tariff logic used in public-utility pricing: keep the small user free, recover fixed costs from the heavier user. The risk is pass-through — if large merchants add the fee to prices, consumers move back to cash, eroding the digital-payments push India built through demonetisation and the 2020 zero-MDR rule.

Impact for India

  • Consumers: No fee for using UPI; the risk is indirect pass-through by large merchants raising prices.
  • Small merchants (kirana stores, average ticket size ₹100-200): Continue to accept UPI free of charge.
  • Large merchants (turnover above ₹1 crore-₹1.5 crore): Could face an MDR on payments above ₹2,000; industry has floated 0.3-0.6% for turnover above ₹50 crore, and 0.05-0.07% for smaller thresholds.
  • Banks and payment processors: A revenue stream to fund infrastructure, security and fraud prevention as UPI scales further.
  • Government: Frees the exchequer from an open-ended subsidy commitment, but takes political risk given the demonetisation-era push into UPI.
  • Credit and debit card industry: Currently faces MDR of 1-3% (credit) and up to 0.9% (debit); UPI at 0.3-0.6% would remain a cheaper acceptance channel.

Key data

Merchant turnover threshold (proposed): Above ₹1 crore-₹1.5 croreIndustry alternative: above ₹50 crore for 0.3-0.6% MDR
Transaction-value threshold (proposed): Above ₹2,000In 2025-26, 4% of P2M UPI payments were >₹2,000, but ~two-thirds by value
UPI transactions (2025-26): 24,000 croreWorth ₹314 lakh crore
Industry annual cost of running UPI: Around ₹15,000 crore
P2M incentive scheme payout, 2021-22 to 2024-25: ₹8,730 croreCap: 0.15% of transaction value; ₹2,000 crore budgeted for 2026-27
Existing card MDR: Credit 1-3%, Debit up to 0.9%Proposed UPI MDR: 0.3-0.6% or 0.05-0.07%

Concepts

Merchant Discount Rate (MDR)The fee a merchant pays to its acquiring bank or payment processor for accepting an electronic payment, expressed as a percentage of the transaction value.Any UPI MDR would be levied on the merchant, not on the paying customer, and would be shared across the banks, PSPs and the network operator.
Two-part tariffA pricing structure with a fixed access charge and a variable per-use charge, used to recover fixed infrastructure cost while keeping marginal use cheap.Exempting small merchants and small-ticket payments while charging large merchants above ₹2,000 mirrors two-part tariff logic — small users free-ride on infrastructure paid for by heavy users.
Zero-MDR policyThe 2020 policy decision that made UPI and RuPay debit card transactions free of merchant charges — a full subsidy to grow acceptance.The pending change unwinds part of the zero-MDR regime but only for large-merchant, high-value flows.
P2M UPI transactionA person-to-merchant UPI payment, as distinct from person-to-person (P2P) transfers between individuals.The 4% of P2M transactions above ₹2,000 concentrate two-thirds of P2M value — the tax base for any MDR.

Theory lens

Public-utility pricing — when a network has high fixed costs and marginal use is nearly costless, a flat unit price either under-recovers fixed costs or prices small users off the network. A two-part tariff (or an income-graduated fee) recovers fixed costs from users who value the network most while keeping marginal access cheap. The proposed UPI MDR, targeted at large merchants and large tickets, matches this design: small merchants and small payments remain free, but the heavier commercial user pays a share of running the rails.

Stakeholders

Gains: Payment processors and banksA defined MDR on large-merchant transactions would fund infrastructure, cybersecurity and fraud prevention as UPI scales.
Gains: Small merchantsExplicitly kept outside the fee net; continue to accept UPI at zero cost.
Gains: Government (fiscal)Reduces reliance on the ~₹2,000 crore-a-year P2M subsidy over time.
Pressure point: Large merchantsFace a new acceptance cost on transactions above ₹2,000 — roughly two-thirds of UPI value.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to the Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 and Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) on UPI, consider the following statements:

  1. The amendment introduces a mandatory Merchant Discount Rate of 0.3-0.6% on all UPI transactions above ₹2,000.
  2. It amends the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 to let the Central government notify UPI and RuPay debit-card transactions that can attract a charge.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: 2 only

  • Statement 1: Incorrect. The amendment does not itself impose an MDR. It only enables the government to notify transactions that can attract a charge. Sources indicate any MDR would apply only to large merchants (turnover above ₹1 crore-₹1.5 crore) and only to payments above ₹2,000 — not all transactions above ₹2,000.
  • Statement 2: Correct. The Bill amends the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 to let the Centre notify UPI and RuPay debit-card transactions that can be charged; earlier, both were expressly exempt.

Therefore, the correct answer is 2 only.

Concept check — test your understanding

Charging only large-merchant, high-ticket UPI payments while keeping small-merchant and low-ticket payments free is closest to which classical public-utility pricing idea?

  1. Marginal cost pricing, where every user pays a price equal to the additional cost of one more transaction.
  2. Two-part tariff, where fixed infrastructure cost is recovered from heavier users while marginal use stays cheap or free for smaller users.
  3. Peak-load pricing, where the fee rises and falls with time-of-day congestion on the network.
  4. A Pigouvian tax, designed to correct a negative externality generated by the transaction itself.
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: B

  • A two-part tariff recovers the large fixed cost of a network from users who value it most, while keeping marginal access cheap — exactly the split between exempt small merchants and charged large merchants proposed here.
  • Marginal cost pricing would charge every UPI transaction, which is what the design deliberately avoids.
  • Peak-load pricing addresses time-varying congestion, not the small-vs-large-merchant split that this policy targets.
  • A Pigouvian tax corrects an externality (say, pollution); a UPI transaction does not generate the kind of external social cost that a Pigouvian levy is meant to price in.