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Bill to end zero-MDR UPI lands as US-India trade deal targets 'level playing field' for card companies

The Finance Ministry has introduced a Bill amending Section 10A of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 to let banks and payment providers charge fees on UPI and RuPay debit-card transactions — landing as the US Trade Representative flags India's zero-Merchant Discount Rate as a foreign trade barrier in the ongoing US-India trade deal.

What happened

The Finance Ministry introduced the Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 in Parliament to amend Section 10A of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, allowing banks and payment system providers to charge fees on UPI and RuPay debit-card payments. UPI transactions have been free since the platform's 2016 launch, a policy that has favoured RuPay and disadvantaged US card networks Visa and Mastercard. Finance Minister Nirmala Sitharaman clarified that the Merchant Discount Rate (MDR — the fee levied on merchants by banks to cover processing, settlement and infrastructure) applies only to merchants, not to end-users; the framework will be finalised once Parliament passes the Bill.

Context

The US Trade Representative in March 2026 classified India's digital payment policies 'favouring' domestic players as a foreign trade barrier and made 'level playing field' access for US electronic payment service suppliers a demand under the US-India trade deal. USTR pointed to National Payment Corporation of India's November 2020 announcement of a 30% market-share cap for third-party UPI apps, whose enforcement has been deferred from January 2023 to December 2026; as of December 31, 2025, two US-owned apps — Walmart-backed PhonePe and Google Pay — together processed over 80% of UPI transactions. India has already met other US digital-sector demands: the last Union Budget offered a tax holiday to foreign firms setting up data centres until 2047, and the 6% equalisation levy on digital services (the 'Google tax') was abolished last year under tariff pressure. Congress's Jairam Ramesh alleged the Bill is being introduced under US pressure; the Finance Ministry did not respond to an emailed query.

Why it matters

Zero-MDR is what made UPI cheap enough to displace cards for everyday retail payments — the revenue pool for Visa, Mastercard and their bank partners shrank as consumers switched to a free, interoperable system. Bringing back MDR on UPI and RuPay would restore some of that revenue pool and, in principle, meet the US 'level playing field' demand. But it also weakens the price advantage that drove UPI's mass adoption, potentially slowing the pace at which cash and cards are being replaced. The Section 301 tariff action against Brazil last month over its Pix instant-payment platform shows the US will now use tariff tools, not just diplomacy, to push back on state-backed low-cost payment systems abroad.

Impact for India

  • UPI merchants and small retailers: If banks pass MDR to merchants, small shops that adopted UPI for its zero-fee attraction face a new operating cost that could dent digital-payment adoption in the informal sector.
  • Consumers: Sitharaman has said the fee will not apply to end-users, but merchants historically pass card MDR through as surcharges; enforcement of the no-pass-through promise is a live question.
  • Banks and fintech payment aggregators: A restored MDR revives an underwriting revenue line that had shrunk with the rise of free UPI, and could fund investment in payments infrastructure.
  • Visa, Mastercard and US card companies: The change directly addresses their long-standing objection to zero-MDR UPI and RuPay preference, easing one trade-deal irritant.
  • RuPay and NPCI: Ending the zero-MDR moat weakens RuPay's cost-based edge over international card networks, though NPCI's platform ownership of UPI is unaffected.
  • India's negotiating position in the US-India trade deal: Removes one USTR complaint, adding to earlier concessions on data-centre tax holidays and the 'Google tax' repeal.

Key data

Bill and Act amended: Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 amending Section 10A of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007
UPI launch year: 2016
NPCI third-party UPI app market-share cap: 30%Deferred from January 2023 to December 2026
US-owned apps' share of UPI transactions: Over 80%PhonePe and Google Pay combined, as of December 31, 2025
US Section 301 tariff on Brazil over Pix and other measures: 25%Imposed last month

Concepts

Merchant Discount Rate (MDR)A fee that banks charge merchants for processing a card or digital payment, covering transaction processing, settlement and infrastructure costs. Card networks and the acquiring bank share the MDR.UPI has operated at zero MDR since 2016; the Bill lets banks charge MDR on UPI and RuPay debit-card payments, restoring a revenue line that free UPI had removed.
Non-tariff barrierA trade restriction other than a customs duty — for example, product standards, licensing rules or preferential domestic policies — that limits or disadvantages foreign firms in a market.USTR classified India's zero-MDR UPI framework and RuPay preference as foreign trade barriers, treating them as non-tariff obstacles to US card companies.
Section 301 of the US Trade Act, 1974A US law that allows the President to investigate and act — including through tariffs — against countries whose economic practices are found to be discriminatory or to burden US commerce.The US invoked Section 301 last month to impose a 25% tariff on Brazil over measures including preferential treatment of its Pix instant-payment platform.
Interoperable payment systemA payments network where consumers, merchants and banks across different apps and providers can transact with each other on a common set of rails.UPI's interoperability plus zero-MDR is what let it displace cards for everyday retail payments — the same feature that shrank fee income for card networks.

Theory lens

Political economy of trade policy — a state-run or state-backed low-cost payment platform is a domestic-industrial-policy tool that yields real consumer welfare gains, but it looks like a non-tariff barrier to foreign firms whose fee-based business model it displaces. The US-India trade-deal push mirrors the Section 301 action against Brazil's Pix: rich-country negotiators trade market-access commitments for retail-payment liberalisation abroad, which is exactly the pattern USTR is running against Brazil, Indonesia, Vietnam, Turkey, China and the GCC states at the same time.

Global context

USTR's foreign-trade-barrier report flags similar 'preferential' domestic-payment measures in Brazil (Pix), Indonesia (National Payment Gateway routing rules), Vietnam (NAPAS card-transaction routing), Turkey (Troy card brand), several GCC states developing domestic card brands, and China (UnionPay's exclusive domestic access). India's Bill therefore fits inside a broader USTR push against state-backed low-cost payment platforms globally, not just a bilateral India-US issue.

Stakeholders

Gains: Visa, Mastercard and US electronic payment service suppliersRestoration of MDR revenue on UPI and RuPay closes a price-based competitive gap they have flagged since 2016.
Gains: Banks and payment aggregatorsNew MDR income can fund infrastructure, security and product investment that free UPI made hard to justify.
Gains: India's US-India trade-deal negotiatorsConcession removes a USTR-listed trade barrier without immediate reciprocal cost.
Pressure point: UPI merchants and small retailersFace a new per-transaction cost that could offset the operating-cost advantage of accepting digital payments over cash.
Pressure point: RuPay's cost-based competitive positionLoses the zero-MDR edge that had helped it grow against Visa and Mastercard.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to India's proposed changes to Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) on UPI and RuPay debit-card payments, consider the following statements:

  1. The Bill introduced by the Finance Ministry amends Section 10A of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007.
  2. The 30% market-share cap for third-party UPI apps announced by the National Payment Corporation of India (NPCI) has been in enforcement since January 2023.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: 1 only

  • Statement 1: Correct — the Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 amends Section 10A of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 to let banks and payment providers charge fees on UPI and RuPay debit-card payments.
  • Statement 2: Incorrect — the 30% cap was originally mandated for January 2023 but NPCI has deferred enforcement; the current deadline is December 2026.

Therefore, the correct answer is 1 only.

Concept check — test your understanding

Under WTO usage, why can a government-backed zero-cost domestic payments platform such as UPI or Pix be treated by a trading partner as a 'non-tariff barrier' even though it imposes no customs duty on foreign firms?

  1. Because a zero-fee state platform automatically becomes a countervailing duty against imported financial services under Article VI of GATT.
  2. Because a preferential state platform can disadvantage foreign firms in effect — displacing their fee-based revenue and restricting market access — without ever taking the form of a customs duty at the border.
  3. Because payment systems are excluded from the National Treatment principle of the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS).
  4. Because non-tariff barriers, by WTO definition, apply only to services delivered digitally across borders, which is why domestic UPI qualifies.
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: B

  • Non-tariff barriers cover restrictions on foreign firms that do not take the form of a customs duty — including preferential domestic standards, licensing rules and, as here, a state-backed zero-cost platform that displaces foreign fee-based providers. That is exactly the ground on which USTR has classified India's zero-MDR framework and RuPay preference as a foreign trade barrier.
  • A invents a mechanism: countervailing duties are a specific remedy against subsidised imports, not a definition of NTBs.
  • C is factually wrong; National Treatment does apply, subject to schedules, and payment systems are not blanket-excluded from GATS.
  • D reverses the concept — NTBs cover a wide range of measures, not just cross-border digital services.