PLI schemes paid out only 18.51% of outlay in six years
Only 18.51% of the outlay of the 14 production-linked incentive (PLI) schemes had been paid out by March 2026, a NITI Aayog and IIM Ahmedabad review finds, and nine schemes had paid less than 10%. The review calls for sector-specific design and demand-side support. A new round for battery-cell plants drew 22 bids for 10 GWh.
What happened
Incentives paid under the 14 production-linked incentive (PLI) schemes notified in 2020 stood at 18.51% of their total outlay as of March 2026, according to an impact assessment released by NITI Aayog and IIM Ahmedabad on Thursday. Nine schemes, including those for bulk drugs, automobiles and textiles, had paid out less than 10% of their outlays. Schemes for drones and drone components, large-scale electronics and food products had paid 25% to 77%. The schemes had attracted ₹2.40 lakh crore of investment, generated production worth ₹22.66 lakh crore and created over 8.49 lakh jobs. The same day, the Ministry of Heavy Industries said it had received 22 bids for 10 GWh of Advanced Chemistry Cell (ACC) battery manufacturing capacity for grid-scale storage, from companies including Reliance Industries, Amara Raja and Exide.
Context
PLI schemes pay incentives only after firms meet set thresholds for investment, production and other criteria. The report says the low payout share is consistent with this design, since incentives are not paid upfront, and notes that not all schemes started in 2020. It finds nearly 70% of the targeted segments broadly on track, with strong results in electronics, telecom and pharmaceutical drugs. Critics point out that the electronics schemes have come with a sharp rise in imports, and that mobile phone output has grown mainly through assembly rather than jobs. The ACC scheme, approved by the Cabinet in May 2021 with an outlay of ₹18,100 crore, aims at 50 GWh of domestic cell capacity. Battery cells and components make up nearly 40% of the cost of an electric vehicle. Bidders must commit minimum investment and raise domestic value addition from 25% to 60% within five years.
Why it matters
The review shifts the question from whether PLI worked to where it works. Paying only for performance protects the budget, because money does not go to firms that fail to produce. But it also means the schemes do little in sectors where firms struggle to reach the thresholds. The report names the reasons for the uneven results: differences in technology, gestation periods, global competition and capital needs. It calls for sector-specific design instead of one template. It also says PLI is largely supply-driven, rewarding output and capacity, and that the next generation of such schemes needs demand-pull measures as well as output incentives. Electronics shows the risk of rewarding output without depth: production can rise while much of the value is added abroad. Battery cells will test whether the model can build deeper manufacturing. The 22 bids show strong interest, and the rising domestic value addition rule is meant to push firms beyond assembly. The report also asks ministries to standardise data on revenue, jobs, production and exports, because today's data make comparisons across sectors and mid-course corrections difficult.
Impact for India
- Public finances: most of the outlay is still unspent; payouts will rise as more firms meet their thresholds.
- Manufacturing: ₹2.40 lakh crore of investment and ₹22.66 lakh crore of production so far, strongest in electronics, telecom and pharmaceutical drugs.
- Jobs: over 8.49 lakh jobs, though mobile phone growth has relied more on assembly than employment.
- Energy transition: 10 GWh of grid-scale cell capacity would cut reliance on imported lithium-ion cells.
- Policy design: future schemes may add demand-side support and sector-specific rules.
Key data
Concepts
Theory lens
Reciprocity in industrial policy — economist Alice Amsden argued that East Asia's subsidies worked because they were reciprocal: firms got support only in return for meeting performance targets, and lost it when they did not. India's older protection gave rents without conditions. PLI follows the reciprocal model, which explains both its strength and its weakness. Paying only on performance limits waste, but firms reach thresholds most easily in activities like assembly, where investment is small and value added low. In sectors with new technology, long gestation or high capital needs, firms may never qualify, so the policy does least where support is hardest to replace. The review's call for sector-specific design is an attempt to set conditions that firms in each sector can realistically meet.
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Practice Question — from the story
With reference to production-linked incentive (PLI) schemes in India, consider the following statements:
- Incentives under PLI schemes are released only after firms meet specified investment and production thresholds.
- The ACC battery PLI scheme requires 60% domestic value addition from the start of production.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: 1 only
- Statement 1: Correct. Incentives are performance-linked and not paid upfront, which the NITI review cites to explain why only 18.51% of the outlay had been paid.
- Statement 2: Incorrect. Domestic value addition starts at 25% and must rise to 60% within five years.
Therefore, the correct answer is 1 only.
Concept check — test your understanding
Why can a low share of disbursement under a production-linked incentive scheme be consistent with its design?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: C
- Payouts follow performance, so in the early years, while firms build plants and raise output, most of the outlay stays unspent.
- PLI incentives are paid on performance, not as upfront capital grants.
- PLI is a Union scheme; unspent outlay does not pass to the States.
- Incentives are cash payments counted against each scheme's outlay, which is how the review measures the 18.51%.