Live on XaptiqUGC NET Economics (Dec 2026) and IIT JAM Economics (EN) test series are now live on Xaptiq.View test series
BusinessIndian EconomyIndustryPublic ExpenditureCuet Pg Eco Indian

PLI schemes paid out only 18.51% of outlay in six years

Only 18.51% of the outlay of the 14 production-linked incentive (PLI) schemes had been paid out by March 2026, a NITI Aayog and IIM Ahmedabad review finds, and nine schemes had paid less than 10%. The review calls for sector-specific design and demand-side support. A new round for battery-cell plants drew 22 bids for 10 GWh.

What happened

Incentives paid under the 14 production-linked incentive (PLI) schemes notified in 2020 stood at 18.51% of their total outlay as of March 2026, according to an impact assessment released by NITI Aayog and IIM Ahmedabad on Thursday. Nine schemes, including those for bulk drugs, automobiles and textiles, had paid out less than 10% of their outlays. Schemes for drones and drone components, large-scale electronics and food products had paid 25% to 77%. The schemes had attracted ₹2.40 lakh crore of investment, generated production worth ₹22.66 lakh crore and created over 8.49 lakh jobs. The same day, the Ministry of Heavy Industries said it had received 22 bids for 10 GWh of Advanced Chemistry Cell (ACC) battery manufacturing capacity for grid-scale storage, from companies including Reliance Industries, Amara Raja and Exide.

Context

PLI schemes pay incentives only after firms meet set thresholds for investment, production and other criteria. The report says the low payout share is consistent with this design, since incentives are not paid upfront, and notes that not all schemes started in 2020. It finds nearly 70% of the targeted segments broadly on track, with strong results in electronics, telecom and pharmaceutical drugs. Critics point out that the electronics schemes have come with a sharp rise in imports, and that mobile phone output has grown mainly through assembly rather than jobs. The ACC scheme, approved by the Cabinet in May 2021 with an outlay of ₹18,100 crore, aims at 50 GWh of domestic cell capacity. Battery cells and components make up nearly 40% of the cost of an electric vehicle. Bidders must commit minimum investment and raise domestic value addition from 25% to 60% within five years.

Why it matters

The review shifts the question from whether PLI worked to where it works. Paying only for performance protects the budget, because money does not go to firms that fail to produce. But it also means the schemes do little in sectors where firms struggle to reach the thresholds. The report names the reasons for the uneven results: differences in technology, gestation periods, global competition and capital needs. It calls for sector-specific design instead of one template. It also says PLI is largely supply-driven, rewarding output and capacity, and that the next generation of such schemes needs demand-pull measures as well as output incentives. Electronics shows the risk of rewarding output without depth: production can rise while much of the value is added abroad. Battery cells will test whether the model can build deeper manufacturing. The 22 bids show strong interest, and the rising domestic value addition rule is meant to push firms beyond assembly. The report also asks ministries to standardise data on revenue, jobs, production and exports, because today's data make comparisons across sectors and mid-course corrections difficult.

Impact for India

  • Public finances: most of the outlay is still unspent; payouts will rise as more firms meet their thresholds.
  • Manufacturing: ₹2.40 lakh crore of investment and ₹22.66 lakh crore of production so far, strongest in electronics, telecom and pharmaceutical drugs.
  • Jobs: over 8.49 lakh jobs, though mobile phone growth has relied more on assembly than employment.
  • Energy transition: 10 GWh of grid-scale cell capacity would cut reliance on imported lithium-ion cells.
  • Policy design: future schemes may add demand-side support and sector-specific rules.

Key data

PLI incentives paid by March 2026, 14 schemes: 18.51% of total outlay
Schemes paying under 10% of outlay: Nine of 14
Investment attracted: ₹2.40 lakh crore
Production generated: ₹22.66 lakh croreOver 8.49 lakh jobs created
ACC battery bids: 2210 GWh on offer

Concepts

Production-linked incentive (PLI)A scheme that pays firms a share of their additional production or sales, but only after they meet set thresholds for investment and output.Only 18.51% of the 14 schemes' outlay had been paid by March 2026.
Domestic value additionThe share of a product's value created within the country, as opposed to imported parts and materials.ACC bidders must raise domestic value addition from 25% to 60% within five years.
Supply-push and demand-pull policySupply-push policy supports producers to raise capacity and output; demand-pull policy creates markets for their products, for example through public purchase or buyer incentives.The review calls PLI largely supply-driven and asks for demand-pull measures in future schemes.

Theory lens

Reciprocity in industrial policy — economist Alice Amsden argued that East Asia's subsidies worked because they were reciprocal: firms got support only in return for meeting performance targets, and lost it when they did not. India's older protection gave rents without conditions. PLI follows the reciprocal model, which explains both its strength and its weakness. Paying only on performance limits waste, but firms reach thresholds most easily in activities like assembly, where investment is small and value added low. In sectors with new technology, long gestation or high capital needs, firms may never qualify, so the policy does least where support is hardest to replace. The review's call for sector-specific design is an attempt to set conditions that firms in each sector can realistically meet.

Stakeholders

Gains: Electronics, telecom and pharmaceutical makersThey have met their thresholds and drawn most of the incentives paid so far.
Gains: Battery makersThe 10 GWh round offers incentives to the winning bidders for grid-scale cell plants.
Pressure point: Firms in bulk drugs, automobiles and textilesTheir schemes have paid out less than 10% of outlays, so support has been thin.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to production-linked incentive (PLI) schemes in India, consider the following statements:

  1. Incentives under PLI schemes are released only after firms meet specified investment and production thresholds.
  2. The ACC battery PLI scheme requires 60% domestic value addition from the start of production.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: 1 only

  • Statement 1: Correct. Incentives are performance-linked and not paid upfront, which the NITI review cites to explain why only 18.51% of the outlay had been paid.
  • Statement 2: Incorrect. Domestic value addition starts at 25% and must rise to 60% within five years.

Therefore, the correct answer is 1 only.

Concept check — test your understanding

Why can a low share of disbursement under a production-linked incentive scheme be consistent with its design?

  1. Because PLI funds are given as upfront capital grants that firms draw down slowly over many years
  2. Because any PLI outlay left unspent at the end of a year passes to the States
  3. Because incentives are paid only after firms meet set thresholds for investment and output, so payouts lag until capacity is built
  4. Because PLI incentives are paid as tax refunds that are counted outside the scheme's outlay
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: C

  • Payouts follow performance, so in the early years, while firms build plants and raise output, most of the outlay stays unspent.
  • PLI incentives are paid on performance, not as upfront capital grants.
  • PLI is a Union scheme; unspent outlay does not pass to the States.
  • Incentives are cash payments counted against each scheme's outlay, which is how the review measures the 18.51%.