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Quick commerce's squeeze on kiranas may shrink its own market, economist argues

Quick commerce apps funded by investors are pulling customers from neighbourhood kiranas, and the shift may weaken the demand it depends on, argues Delhi University economist Trishna Sarkar.

What happened

Investor-backed delivery apps are winning an unequal contest against neighbourhood kirana stores, argues Trishna Sarkar, an assistant professor of economics at Dr BhimRao Ambedkar College, University of Delhi. Quick commerce crossed 9 million orders a day in August 2026, she writes, citing Datum Intelligence. The dark store network of the three largest players grew by nearly 48% in a year to 5,026 stores. In a 2024 Datum survey, 82% of buyers had shifted at least a quarter of their kirana purchases to the apps. Shopkeepers in Delhi speak of a 30-40% drop in business.

Context

Kiranas are part of India's MSME sector, which has over 7.47 crore enterprises supporting around 32.8 crore livelihoods, according to the Ministry of MSME. Most are micro units with thin margins and little capital. A kirana combined retail, informal credit through a monthly khata and local information in one counter. The competitors include Blinkit, Zepto, Swiggy Instamart, Flipkart Minutes, Amazon Now, BB Now and JioMart, which deliver groceries in minutes. Distributors reported a month-on-month drop of 25-30% in general trade going into Diwali 2024.

Why it matters

The contest is uneven. A platform backed by investors can absorb losses for years, discount heavily and use data to predict demand. A micro enterprise must pay rent, wages and stock out of each month's turnover. Sarkar argues the shift may undermine itself in three ways. First, customers are also earners: shop owners who close often return as delivery riders or app workers, with lower and less predictable incomes, so they spend less. Second, investor-funded discounts cannot last. Quick commerce sequential growth fell below 20% in Q1 FY26 as platforms turned to profitability, and if local shops are gone when prices rise, consumers have few options. Third, money spent at a kirana circulates locally, through the owner, the helper and the local wholesaler, while app spending flows to distant logistics networks and investors. NITI Aayog counted 77 lakh gig workers in 2020-21 and projects 2.35 crore by 2029-30. These are real jobs, Sarkar writes, but they offer less ownership and security than the businesses they replace.

Impact for India

  • Kirana owners and other micro enterprises: loss of customers to apps that can sell below cost for long periods.
  • Gig and delivery workers: displaced owners re-enter as task-based earners without social security.
  • Consumers: convenience and discounts now, but fewer alternatives if prices rise later.
  • Local economies: less spending circulates in the neighbourhood, and informal credit through the khata disappears.
  • Policy: the author calls for platform-kirana partnerships, fair competition, social security for gig workers and wider use of ONDC.

Key data

Quick commerce orders per day, August 2026: Over 9 millionDatum Intelligence
Dark stores of the three largest players: 5,026Up nearly 48% in a year
Buyers who shifted a quarter or more of kirana purchases to apps: 82%Datum Intelligence 2024
MSME enterprises: Over 7.47 croreAround 32.8 crore livelihoods
Gig workers: 77 lakh in 2020-21Projected 2.35 crore by 2029-30NITI Aayog

Concepts

Quick commerceOnline delivery of groceries and daily needs within minutes, served from small local warehouses called dark stores.The three largest players' dark store network grew to 5,026 stores in a year.
Predatory pricingSelling below cost to drive rivals out of a market, with the aim of raising prices once competition has weakened.The author warns that investor-funded discounts cannot last, and consumers may have few options when they end.
Local multiplierThe extra local income created when money spent in an area is spent again by those who receive it in the same area.A rupee spent at a kirana passes to the owner, helper and wholesaler; app spending leaves the locality.

Theory lens

The multiplier and leakages — each round of spending creates income that is partly spent again, but money that leaks out of a circuit stops generating further rounds. Sarkar applies this to neighbourhoods: a rupee spent at a kirana is re-spent locally by the owner, the helper and the wholesaler, while a rupee spent on an app goes largely to distant logistics networks and investors. As local spending leaks away, the activity that sustained other small businesses shrinks too.

Stakeholders

Gains: Quick commerce platformsOrders crossed 9 million a day and dark stores grew nearly 48% to 5,026.
Gains: Urban consumersGroceries delivered in minutes, often at a discount.
Pressure point: Kirana and parlour ownersDelhi shopkeepers report a 30-40% drop in business.
Pressure point: Local wholesalers and distributorsDistributors reported a 25-30% month-on-month drop in general trade before Diwali 2024.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to the growth of quick commerce and gig work in India, consider the following statements:

  1. The dark store network of the three largest quick commerce players grew by nearly 48% in a year to 5,026 stores.
  2. NITI Aayog projects the number of gig workers to rise from 77 lakh in 2020-21 to 2.35 crore by 2029-30.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: Both 1 and 2

  • Statement 1: Correct. The article cites Equirus Securities: the three largest players' dark stores grew nearly 48% in a year to 5,026.
  • Statement 2: Correct. NITI Aayog counted 77 lakh gig workers in 2020-21 and projects 2.35 crore by 2029-30.

Therefore, the correct answer is Both 1 and 2.

Concept check — test your understanding

In competition economics, why can deep discounts funded by investor capital harm consumers in the long run even though they lower prices today?

  1. Because lower prices always force sellers to cut the quality of the goods they sell
  2. Because below-cost pricing can push smaller rivals out, after which the surviving firms can raise prices with less competition
  3. Because heavy discounts count as dumping under WTO rules and invite anti-dumping duties on the goods
  4. Because consumers who buy at a discount save more, which lowers aggregate demand in the economy
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: B

  • This is the predatory pricing concern: losses today buy market power tomorrow, once rivals that cannot absorb losses have exited.
  • Lower prices need not reduce quality; that is not the competition concern here.
  • Dumping refers to exporting goods below their home-market price; it is a trade-remedy concept, not a domestic retail one.
  • Paying less for goods does not by itself reduce aggregate demand; the concern is about market structure, not saving.