Live on XaptiqUGC NET Economics (Dec 2026) and IIT JAM Economics (EN) test series are now live on Xaptiq.View test series
BusinessEnergy > Gas ImportsInternational EconomicsBalance of PaymentsOpen Economy Macro

Oman displaces the US as India's top LNG supplier in September

Oman and Nigeria topped India's liquefied natural gas supplier list in September as American cargoes went to Europe, while Gulf exporters resumed shipping through the Strait of Hormuz despite the conflict.

What happened

India's liquefied natural gas import slate was reshuffled in September, with Oman and Nigeria topping the supplier list and the United States slipping to third as European buyers competed harder for American cargoes. Imports from the US fell 60.7% month-on-month to 0.34 million tonnes, while Oman's rose 11.6% to 0.59 million tonnes, according to vessel tracking data from Kpler. Nigeria declined 35.1% to 0.35 million tonnes and the UAE rose 27.3% to 0.31 million tonnes. Total imports were 2.24 million tonnes, down 12.7% on the month but 7% higher year-on-year.

Context

India depends on imported liquefied natural gas for about half its natural gas requirement, and roughly 60% of those imports used to come through the Strait of Hormuz, chiefly from Qatar and also the UAE. Before the West Asia conflict Qatar was India's top source, with the UAE and the US trading second and third place. Qatar's September volumes rose 6.7% sequentially to 0.1 million tonnes but were down 88.5% year-on-year. In August the US had been the top supplier, followed by Nigeria, Oman and the UAE. Unlike Qatar and the UAE, Oman's exports do not depend on the strait.

Why it matters

Two separate adjustments are visible in one month's data, and they point in opposite directions. The first is substitution by geography: India has been buying from suppliers that do not need the Strait of Hormuz, which is why Oman at 0.59 million tonnes now leads. The second is a partial return of risk appetite, with UAE volumes up 27.3% and Qatar's up 6.7% sequentially as those exporters resumed sailings, reportedly by switching off tanker transponders and using windows judged safe on maritime security assessments. The third force is competitive rather than military: American cargoes were pulled to Europe, so India's loss of US supply is a price and demand effect, not a blockade effect. Underneath all of it, imports were 7% higher year-on-year, because New Delhi has been prioritising supply over price for city gas distribution, fertiliser, power and ceramics, and because weaker hydropower and a stretched coal fleet increased the call on gas for electricity.

Impact for India

  • Supply security: Oman at 0.59 million tonnes leads precisely because its exports do not transit the Strait of Hormuz.
  • Price exposure: Indian importers have been competing for spot cargoes at above-normal prices while some other large Asian buyers curtailed imports.
  • Gas-using sectors: city gas distribution, fertiliser, power and ceramics are the named sources of demand being prioritised over price.
  • Power sector link: weaker hydropower availability and stretched coal-fired generation raised the call on gas for electricity in September.
  • Qatar: volumes are down 88.5% year-on-year, a structural loss of India's former top supplier even after a 6.7% sequential recovery.
  • United States: a 60.7% monthly fall to 0.34 million tonnes reflects European competition for cargoes rather than any physical disruption.

Key data

Total LNG imports, September: 2.24 million tonnesDown 12.7% month-on-monthBut 7% higher year-on-year
Oman: 0.59 million tonnesUp 11.6%Now India's top supplier, with exports that avoid the Strait of Hormuz
United States: 0.34 million tonnesDown 60.7% month-on-monthWas the top supplier in August
Qatar: 0.1 million tonnesUp 6.7% sequentially but down 88.5% year-on-yearIndia's top source before the conflict
Import dependence: About half of natural gas requirementAround 60% of LNG imports formerly came via the Strait of Hormuz

Concepts

Liquefied natural gas (LNG)Natural gas cooled to a liquid so it can be shipped by tanker rather than piped, which lets a buyer switch suppliers by sea.That shippability is what allowed India to replace Hormuz-dependent supply with Omani and Nigerian cargoes within a month.
Chokepoint riskThe exposure created when a large share of trade must pass through a narrow maritime passage that can be closed or made unsafe.Around 60% of India's LNG imports formerly transited the Strait of Hormuz, which is the dependence being unwound.
Spot versus term contractsSpot cargoes are bought for near-term delivery at prevailing prices; term contracts fix volumes and a pricing formula over years.Indian importers have been paying super-normal spot prices to secure volumes rather than waiting for contracted supply.
Supply diversificationDeliberately spreading purchases across sources so that losing any one does not interrupt supply, usually at some cost in price.Imports rose 7% year-on-year from a diversified pool even as the single largest pre-war source fell 88.5%.

Theory lens

Price elasticity and the value of supply security - when a buyer's demand is highly inelastic, as it is for fuel feeding city gas networks, fertiliser plants and power stations, the buyer will accept a worse price rather than a smaller quantity. India's September slate shows that preference acted on: importers paid super-normal spot prices and total volumes still rose 7% year-on-year, while some other large Asian buyers, facing more elastic demand, curtailed purchases instead.

Global context

The reshuffle was driven as much by European demand as by West Asian risk. American cargoes that had gone to India were pulled towards Europe as importers there stepped up competition, which is why US volumes to India fell 60.7% in a month without any physical disruption to that route. Meanwhile other major Asian LNG buyers cut imports in the face of high prices, leaving Indian importers bidding for spot cargoes against a thinner field of Asian competition but a stronger European one.

Stakeholders

Gains: OmanVolumes up 11.6% to 0.59 million tonnes, topping the supplier list on exports that avoid the strait.
Gains: The UAEVolumes up 27.3% to 0.31 million tonnes on a higher tolerance for sailing through the strait.
Gains: Indian gas-fired generatorsHigher gas availability supported power generation as hydropower weakened and coal plants ran stretched.
Pressure point: United States exporters to IndiaVolumes fell 60.7% month-on-month to 0.34 million tonnes as European buyers outbid Indian importers.
Pressure point: QatarVolumes remain 88.5% below a year earlier despite a 6.7% sequential rise.
Pressure point: Indian importersBuying spot cargoes at super-normal prices, having prioritised supply over price.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to India's liquefied natural gas imports in September 2026, consider the following statements:

  1. Qatar topped the list of India's LNG suppliers for the month.
  2. India's total LNG imports for the month were 12.7% higher than a year earlier.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: Neither 1 nor 2

  • Statement 1: Incorrect because Oman and Nigeria topped the supplier list, followed by the United States; Qatar supplied 0.1 million tonnes, down 88.5% year-on-year.
  • Statement 2: Incorrect on both the direction and the comparison: total imports of 2.24 million tonnes were 12.7% lower month-on-month, while the year-on-year change was an increase of 7%.

Therefore, the correct answer is Neither 1 nor 2.

Concept check — test your understanding

India paid above-normal spot prices to secure LNG cargoes while some other large Asian buyers cut their purchases instead. What does that difference in behaviour suggest?

  1. That India had long-term contracts fixing its price, so the spot market level did not affect it.
  2. That India's demand for the fuel is less responsive to price, so it adjusts on price rather than on quantity.
  3. That Indian importers expected prices to fall and were buying ahead of the decline.
  4. That Indian buyers had better access to shipping and so faced lower delivered costs.
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: B

  • When demand is inelastic - here because city gas networks, fertiliser plants and power stations need the fuel regardless - a buyer accepts a worse price rather than a smaller quantity, which is why volumes still rose 7% year-on-year.
  • Option A contradicts the behaviour described, since the premium was being paid precisely in the spot market.
  • Option C describes a speculative motive, but buying ahead of an expected fall would mean paying less now, not more.
  • Option D is plausible logistics reasoning, but the cargoes India lost were American ones outbid by European buyers, not ones it could not ship.