ADNOC wants its India crude storage raised to 30 million barrels
ADNOC supplied more than 500,000 barrels a day to India in 2025 and wants its Indian crude storage raised to as much as 30 million barrels.
What happened
ADNOC is open to further long-term liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) supply agreements with India and is working with Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited (ISPRL) towards raising its crude oil storage capacity in the country to as much as 30 million barrels, its acting downstream chief executive Nasser Omair Al Muhairi said in an exclusive interview. That would build on 5.86 million barrels of existing storage at Mangaluru, with potential new facilities at Visakhapatnam and Chandikhol. ADNOC supplied more than 500,000 barrels of crude a day to India in 2025, almost one in ten barrels of India's crude imports.
Context
Indian Oil signed a strategic collaboration agreement with ADNOC in May during Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the United Arab Emirates, seeking to expand LPG supply and trading and potentially pave the way for a long-term sale and purchase agreement, building on an LPG term contract in place since 2023. ADNOC is also among India's leading suppliers of LNG and naphtha, and is working to raise its own oil production capacity to five million barrels a day by 2027 while expanding domestic gas output.
Why it matters
Three distinct economics sit inside one supplier relationship. The first is concentration. Almost one in ten barrels of India's crude comes from a single company, which is a dependence and a hedge at once: reliable term supply lowers exposure to spot volatility while raising exposure to one counterparty. The second is the choice between term and spot. A long-term sale and purchase agreement fixes volumes and pricing arrangements in advance, which matters most when markets are disrupted — Al Muhairi says recent market conditions have reinforced the value of an integrated approach, with logistics and export infrastructure helping maintain reliable and flexible supply during periods of disruption. The third, and the newest, is storage. Raising ADNOC's Indian capacity towards 30 million barrels from 5.86 million at Mangaluru would place a foreign producer's crude on Indian soil within reach of Indian refiners, and the immediate work is commercial and regulatory — determining capacities, investment and timelines with ISPRL. The two sides are separately examining storing Indian crude at Fujairah in the UAE as part of India's strategic petroleum reserve network, which runs the same logic in reverse by siting part of the reserve abroad, closer to the source.
Impact for India
- Indian refiners: term supply of more than 500,000 barrels a day, almost one in ten barrels imported, with LPG, LNG and naphtha alongside crude.
- Strategic petroleum reserve: capacity could rise towards 30 million barrels from the 5.86 million at Mangaluru, with Visakhapatnam and Chandikhol as candidate sites.
- Supplier concentration: a deeper relationship with one producer cuts spot exposure and raises counterparty exposure at the same time.
- Fujairah option: storing part of India's reserve in the UAE would place cover closer to the source but outside Indian jurisdiction.
- Project sequencing: the binding constraint named is commercial and regulatory work with ISPRL on capacities, investment and timelines, not supply availability.
Key data
Concepts
Theory lens
Import dependence and the terms of trade — for a large net importer of one commodity, the price of that commodity passes straight into the current account, so policy works on the terms of purchase rather than on the quantity bought. Every instrument in this story is a term: a standing LPG contract rather than cargo-by-cargo buying, a long-term sale and purchase agreement under discussion, and storage of up to 30 million barrels that lets a purchase be timed instead of forced.
Global context
ADNOC is lifting its own oil production capacity towards five million barrels a day by 2027 while expanding domestic gas output and broadening access to global LNG supplies, and describes India as one of its most important energy markets. The storage discussion runs in both directions: new Indian facilities at Visakhapatnam and Chandikhol are under consideration, and so is holding Indian strategic crude at Fujairah in the UAE.
Stakeholders
Practice Question — from the story
With reference to ADNOC’s energy relationship with India, consider the following statements:
- ADNOC supplied more than five million barrels of crude oil a day to India in 2025.
- ADNOC’s existing crude oil storage in India is 5.86 million barrels at Mangaluru, and the collaboration envisages raising capacity to as much as 30 million barrels.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: 2 only
- Statement 1: Incorrect. ADNOC supplied more than 500,000 barrels a day to India in 2025, almost one in ten barrels of India’s crude imports. The five million barrels a day figure is ADNOC’s own total production capacity target for 2027, not its supply to India.
- Statement 2: Correct. Existing storage stands at 5.86 million barrels in Mangaluru, and the collaboration with ISPRL envisages capacity of as much as 30 million barrels, with Visakhapatnam and Chandikhol as potential sites.
Therefore, the correct answer is 2 only.
Concept check — test your understanding
What is the primary economic purpose of a strategic petroleum reserve for a large net oil importer?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: C
- A reserve buys optionality, not oil. It lets consumption continue while purchases are deferred, which both protects physical supply and removes the compulsion to transact into a spike.
- Option A describes something governments sometimes do opportunistically when filling a reserve, but trading is not the purpose; a reserve run for profit would be empty exactly when it is needed.
- Option B is the most common misconception. Stored crude is still bought and still paid for, so the reserve changes the timing of the import bill, not its size.
- Option D names a real obligation, since International Energy Agency members do carry a minimum import-cover requirement. India’s reserve programme is a national policy choice, so the obligation is not what drives it.