India takes 5.7% of global greenfield investment, double China's share
India accounted for 5.7% of global greenfield investment between 2020 and 2025, more than double China's 2.8%, UNCTAD reports. But strategic sectors — now 44% of all greenfield investment, up from 16% — remain concentrated in Europe and North America, which took 28.4% and 28% of them.
What happened
India's share of global greenfield investment during 2020-25 stood at 5.7%, more than double China's share over the same period, according to the Trade and Development Report 2026 from the UN Conference on Trade and Development. India led the ranking, followed by Malaysia at 4%, Indonesia at 3.8% and China at 2.8%. Greenfield investment refers to investment by companies in new ventures in another country. The report said strategic sectors grew from 16% to 44% of global greenfield investment between 2020 and 2025.
Context
Within those strategic sectors, artificial intelligence infrastructure and related technologies attracted the largest share at 12.4% of the $845.7 billion of overall global greenfield investment in the period, followed by the semiconductor value chain at 8.1% and energy transition technologies and services at 7.8%. The report also places India high on industrial policy activism: during 2008-21 India implemented 1,416 industrial policies, behind only China's 4,201 and the United States' 4,025. In the much shorter 2022-25 period India implemented 707 measures, about half the earlier total, but fell in the rankings as the United States, China, Australia and Brazil all implemented more.
Why it matters
Two findings sit in tension. India is winning a large and rising share of new cross-border projects, but the investment that carries technology is still going elsewhere. UNCTAD's own framing is that "the geographic disparity in strategic investment underscores the growing integration challenges for the global South, especially for the least developed countries": Europe took 28.4% of strategic investment and North America another 28%, and even within the developing world capital concentrates in developing Asia at 26.5%, led by China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. So a headline share of 5.7% and a weak position in AI infrastructure and semiconductors can both be true at once, and the second is what determines whether the first compounds. The industrial policy numbers point the same way — more measures do not automatically mean more strategic investment, and India's relative position slipped even as its absolute activity stayed high.
Impact for India
- Investment composition: India leads the global greenfield share table at 5.7%, but strategic sectors — 44% of all greenfield investment — concentrate in Europe at 28.4% and North America at 28%.
- Technology sectors: AI infrastructure took 12.4% of the $845.7 billion total, the semiconductor value chain 8.1% and energy transition 7.8%, the three areas where location decides who holds future capability.
- Industrial policy: 707 measures in 2022-25 against 1,416 across 2008-21, but a lower ranking as the United States, China, Australia and Brazil moved faster.
- Growth outlook: UNCTAD projects India's GDP expanding 7.3% in 2026 and 6.8% in 2027 on domestic demand, manufacturing capacity and public infrastructure, sustaining growth despite heavy reliance on oil imports.
- Consumption: household consumption growth is estimated at 6.9% this year and 5.6% next, which the report calls a significant deceleration as higher prices and input costs rein in expansion.
Key data
Concepts
Theory lens
Product cycle theory — new technology is developed and first produced in advanced economies, with production migrating to developing ones only as the technology matures and standardises. The data fit the pattern: India leads on greenfield investment overall while AI infrastructure and semiconductor investment stay concentrated in Europe and North America, which places India in the later rather than the earlier stage of the cycle.
Global context
The concentration is explicit in the report's regional numbers. Europe accounted for 28.4% of strategic investment and North America another 28%, together more than half, while developing Asia took 26.5% led by five economies. On industrial policy the United States and China ran far ahead of India even in the earlier period, at 4,025 and 4,201 measures against India's 1,416, and both accelerated afterwards.
Stakeholders
Practice Question — from the story
With reference to UNCTAD's Trade and Development Report 2026 findings on greenfield investment, consider the following statements:
- India accounted for 5.7% of global greenfield investment during 2020-25, ahead of Malaysia, Indonesia and China.
- Strategic sectors rose from 16% to 44% of global greenfield investment over the same period, with Europe and North America taking the larger share of them.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: Both 1 and 2
- Statement 1: Correct — India led at 5.7%, followed by Malaysia at 4%, Indonesia at 3.8% and China at 2.8%.
- Statement 2: Correct — strategic sectors grew from 16% to 44% of the global total, and Europe accounted for 28.4% of strategic investment with North America taking another 28%.
Therefore, the correct answer is Both 1 and 2.
Concept check — test your understanding
A developing economy attracts a large share of new foreign projects but little of the investment in frontier technology sectors. Which framework best describes this?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: D
- The product cycle predicts exactly this split: mature, standardised production relocates to cost-competitive economies while innovation-stage activity stays where it originated. India leading on overall greenfield share while AI and semiconductor investment concentrates in Europe and North America is the pattern it describes.
- Option A explains the composition of trade by endowments and is genuinely relevant to where labour-intensive production goes, but it says nothing about the timing of technology diffusion.
- Option B describes a real structural transition in developing economies, and is about internal labour reallocation rather than the location of foreign investment.
- Option C would apply if the restriction were a policy choice; here the concentration is an outcome of investors' location decisions, not of Indian import policy.