Supreme Court questions drug markups as price control covers 20% of market
Price controls reach only 20% of India's drug market, and the Supreme Court has called the gap between a medicine's price to retailers and its MRP "daylight dacoity".
What happened
The Supreme Court on September 29 described the markup between the price at which medicines reach retailers and the price printed on the pack as "carnage", calling it "broad daylight dacoity with patients". A bench of Justices Vikram Nath and Sandeep Mehta asked the Centre why the 16% retailer margin under the Drugs (Prices Control) Order (DPCO), 2013 should not apply to all essential medicines. The remarks came over an essential cancer drug supplied to retailers at Rs 2,700 but carrying an MRP of nearly Rs 27,000.
Context
The Essential Commodities Act, 1955 gives the Centre power over essential goods. Section 3(1) allows it to regulate production, supply and distribution, and Section 3(2)(c) allows orders controlling prices. The DPCO is such an order, and it authorises the National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPPA), set up in 1997 under the Department of Pharmaceuticals, to fix and revise ceiling prices, monitor overcharging and order recovery where patients have been overcharged. Medicines listed in Schedule I of the DPCO, drawn from the National List of Essential Medicines, are price-controlled. That list holds 384 medicines, accounting for only 20% of total drug market turnover.
Why it matters
The ceiling is built from the market, not from cost. The NPPA takes every version of a formulation that holds at least 1% of domestic sales, averages the price to retailer, and adds a 16% retailer margin. If three versions carry prices to retailer of Rs 8, Rs 10 and Rs 12, the average is 10 and the ceiling becomes Rs 11.60. Ceilings are revised each April 1 by the change in the Wholesale Price Index, and manufacturers must cut prices within 45 days if that index falls. Because the formula averages prices already being charged, the cap tracks existing market conduct rather than the cost of making the drug. For medicines outside Schedule I there is no ceiling at all: manufacturers set the launch MRP freely, and the only restraint is that it cannot rise more than 10% in 12 months. Petitioners argue this makes the restraint hollow, since an inflated launch price is never tested and the annual limit then protects it.
Impact for India
- Patients on costly therapies: An essential cancer drug reaches retailers at Rs 2,700 and carries an MRP of nearly Rs 27,000, which the bench called extortion.
- Scope of control: Schedule I covers 384 medicines, only 20% of total drug market turnover, leaving the rest without a ceiling price.
- Hospital pharmacy bills: A plea says 30-40% of a critically ill patient's bill in a corporate hospital is pharmacy expense, and cites the antibiotic Tigebax 50mg at an MRP of Rs 5,635 inside hospitals against Rs 350 in the open market.
- Retail chain: One plea claims retailers extract far more profit than the permissible 16% margin allows.
- Generic prescribing: Citing statements in the Lok Sabha, a petition says medicines sold under composition names are 50% to 90% cheaper than branded equivalents.
- Constitutional footing: The PILs root the power to regulate medicine prices in Article 21, the right to health read into the right to life.
Key data
Concepts
Theory lens
Price ceilings and regulatory anchoring — a binding ceiling normally sits below the prevailing price and transfers surplus from seller to buyer, but how much it bites depends entirely on where the regulator sets it. The DPCO derives the ceiling from the average price to retailer already being charged, plus a 16% margin, so the cap moves with the very conduct it is meant to discipline. Outside Schedule I, where the launch price is unregulated, the 10% annual limit simply protects whatever was set on day one.
Stakeholders
Practice Question — from the story
With reference to the Drugs (Prices Control) Order, 2013, consider the following statements:
- The ceiling price of a scheduled formulation is computed by averaging the prices to retailer of versions holding at least 1% of market share and adding a 16% retailer margin.
- Medicines listed in Schedule I account for only about 20% of total drug market turnover.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: Both 1 and 2
- Statement 1: Correct. The NPPA averages the price to retailer across versions above 1% of domestic sales and adds a 16% retailer margin to arrive at the ceiling price.
- Statement 2: Correct. Schedule I, drawn from the National List of Essential Medicines, holds 384 medicines accounting for only 20% of total drug market turnover.
Therefore, the correct answer is Both 1 and 2.
Concept check — test your understanding
India sets a controlled medicine's ceiling price by averaging the prices already charged to retailers and adding a fixed retailer margin. What is the main weakness of deriving a price cap this way?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: C
- The cap is built from conduct rather than cost. The regulator averages the prices to retailer of versions holding at least 1% of the market and adds a 16% margin, so a segment where prices are already high yields a correspondingly high ceiling.
- Option A describes cost-based regulation, which is precisely what this formula avoids. No estimate of production cost enters the calculation.
- Option B is the textbook shortage result for a ceiling set below cost, but this ceiling sits above the average price to retailer by construction, so it does not bind in that way.
- Option D is true of the order's coverage, since Schedule I is only about 20% of market turnover, but that is a limit on scope rather than a flaw in how the ceiling itself is derived.