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NSE chairman puts regulatory duty before revenue as derivatives curbs bite

Giving investors a market with integrity comes before the exchange's own business, NSE Chairman Srinivas Injeti said, as derivatives curbs cut into its largest revenue source.

What happened

The National Stock Exchange's primary duty is to ensure a safe and trusted market for investors even at the cost of business for the exchange, Chairman Srinivas Injeti said at a media briefing, a day after NSE's listing. He said the excessive dependence on the derivatives segment will have to be reduced, and that there is no jugglery by which quarterly results can be conjured around it. Before the regulatory tightening, NSE and BSE were deriving over 90% of their revenues from derivatives. NSE's shares listed on the BSE on Thursday at a premium of around 1%.

Context

A SEBI study last month found that nearly 9 in 10 individual traders continued to face losses in 2025-26, with the average loss per trader rising 2% year-on-year, even as retail participation in equity derivatives cooled for the first time in at least five years. The regulator had already limited expiries to one per exchange and increased lot sizes of derivative contracts. Injeti suggested the wider scrutiny followed from the imbalance itself: had the dominance of options gone unquestioned, SEBI might not have turned to commodities and data connectivity.

Why it matters

An exchange is both a business and the first line of supervision for the market it runs. The two roles collide when the most profitable segment is also the one where most users lose money. Derivatives were a cash cow for both bourses, and nearly 9 in 10 retail traders in that segment lose money. Reducing the dependence therefore means deliberately shrinking revenue, and Injeti conceded there is no way to manage that quarter to quarter once the exchange is listed. The same tension is the stated reason SEBI still bars an exchange from listing on its own platform. Injeti wants that rule eased, and his own remarks are the clearest illustration of why the regulator hesitates.

Impact for India

  • Retail derivatives traders: Nearly 9 in 10 faced losses in 2025-26, and the average loss per trader rose 2% year-on-year despite curbs on expiries and larger lot sizes.
  • NSE and BSE: Derivatives supplied over 90% of revenues at one point, so both must rebuild their revenue mix.
  • NSE's diversification: The exchange is leaning on the cash market, electronic gold receipts and commodities instead.
  • Foreign portfolio investors: SEBI on Thursday allowed them into physically settled non-agricultural commodity derivatives, which is expected to lift bullion volumes.
  • Exchange governance: Injeti argued SEBI should permit self-listing, which major markets such as the United States allow and India prohibits on conflict-of-interest grounds.

Key data

Share of exchange revenues from derivatives: Over 90%NSE and BSE, at one point before tightening
Individual traders facing losses in 2025-26: Nearly 9 in 10Average loss per trader up 2% year-on-yearSEBI study last month
NSE listing premium on the BSE: Around 1%Listed Thursday
Year exchange listing was first permitted: 2012Self-listing still prohibited

Concepts

Equity derivativesContracts such as futures and options whose value derives from an underlying share or index.The segment supplied over 90% of NSE and BSE revenues at one point.
Market Infrastructure InstitutionA body such as an exchange, clearing corporation or depository that forms the plumbing of a securities market.Before 2012 an MII could not list its shares at all.
Self-listingAn exchange listing its own shares on the platform it operates, which most regulators treat as a conflict of interest.NSE listed on the BSE instead, and wants the Indian prohibition reconsidered.
Permitted-to-trade routeAn arrangement letting a share trade on an exchange without being listed there, leaving regulatory oversight with the exchange where it is listed.NSE has not yet approached SEBI to use it for its own shares.

Theory lens

Conflict of interest in self-regulation — when the institution policing a market also earns from its turnover, its commercial incentive pulls against its supervisory duty, which is why regulators either separate the two functions or cap the overlap. The NSE case is textbook: the segment it is being asked to restrain supplied over 90% of its revenue. Injeti's case for self-listing asks the regulator to trust that separation further than it currently does.

Historical parallel

Until 2012 a stock exchange or market infrastructure institution could not list its shares at all, and that prohibition was lifted in the same year. Injeti draws on the change to argue the remaining restriction on self-listing should also go now that the Indian market has matured. The pattern is incremental: each relaxation arrives when the regulator judges the conflict manageable rather than absent.

Global context

Self-listing is permitted across various major markets, including the United States, while the Indian regulator continues to prohibit it citing conflict of interest, and foreign investors have raised similar concerns about the Indian restriction. The divergence turns less on market maturity than on how far each regulator is willing to trust an exchange to oversee trading in its own shares.

Stakeholders

Gains: Retail investorsThe tightening in derivatives is aimed at protecting them, in a segment where nearly 9 in 10 lose money.
Gains: NSE's commodity and cash segmentsThey become the growth areas as derivatives dependence is cut deliberately.
Gains: Foreign portfolio investorsSEBI has opened physically settled non-agricultural commodity derivatives to them.
Pressure point: NSE and BSEThe segment that supplied over 90% of revenues at one point is being restrained by design.
Pressure point: NSE's new shareholdersThe exchange listed on Thursday at a premium of around 1% into a shrinking core segment.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to the regulation and revenue mix of Indian stock exchanges, consider the following statements:

  1. SEBI permitted stock exchanges to list their shares on their own platforms in 2012.
  2. Before the tightening of derivatives regulation, NSE and BSE were deriving over 90% of their revenues from the derivatives segment.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: 2 only

  • Statement 1: Incorrect because what 2012 permitted was listing itself, which no exchange or market infrastructure institution could do before that year. Self-listing on an exchange's own platform remains prohibited by SEBI on conflict-of-interest grounds, which is the relaxation Injeti is asking for. NSE listed on the BSE.
  • Statement 2: Correct because both bourses were drawing over 90% of their revenues from the derivatives segment at one point before the regulatory tightening.

Therefore, the correct answer is 2 only.

Concept check — test your understanding

Why does a stock exchange that both operates a market and supervises it face a conflict of interest?

  1. Its listed companies are also fee-paying clients, so enforcing disclosure rules against them costs it business
  2. Its shareholders are entitled to a share of the penalties it levies on erring trading members
  3. It collects securities transaction tax, so heavier trading directly adds to its own revenue
  4. Its revenue rises with volume in the very segment it may need to restrain to protect investors
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: D

  • The exchange earns on turnover, so the commercially attractive course is more trading, while the supervisory course may be less of it. That is exactly the bind Injeti described: derivatives supplied over 90% of revenue and is the segment regulators are curbing for investor protection.
  • Option A describes a real and well-documented conflict at exchanges, between listing revenue and disclosure enforcement. It is a good answer to a different question, since the tension here runs through trading volume rather than listing fees.
  • Option B misstates how enforcement works. Penalties are not a revenue stream shared with shareholders, so no such incentive exists.
  • Option C confuses the exchange with a collection agent. Securities transaction tax is collected for the government and does not accrue to the exchange.