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EconomyBanking & FinanceMonetary EconomicsForex ReservesFcnr B Deposits

RBI's FCNR(B) swap draws $136.377 billion, dwarfs 2013 haul

RBI's special dollar-rupee swap facility mobilised $136.377 billion by August 31, roughly four times the 2013 comparator, with FCNR(B) deposits alone bringing in $127.226 billion.

What happened

The Reserve Bank of India's special US dollar-rupee swap facility drew $136.377 billion in foreign-currency inflows through August 31, 2026, far above the $70-$80 billion bankers had expected when it opened on June 8. FCNR(B) deposits — fixed-term dollar deposits held by non-resident Indians — contributed $127.226 billion. Overseas Foreign Currency Borrowings brought in $5.260 billion and External Commercial Borrowings $3.891 billion. The RBI closed the FCNR(B) window early on August 31 after an 'encouraging response'; the ECB and OFCB windows stay open until December 31, 2026. India's forex reserves hit a record $729.33 billion as on August 21.

Context

The RBI launched the concessional swap on June 8, 2026, to defend the rupee and pad reserves as global trade tensions and the Middle East conflict pressured capital flows. Banks were drawn in because the RBI absorbed their currency-hedging cost through the swap, and offered FCNR(B) rates of 6-6.5% (some smaller banks 7-7.5%). The 2013 version of this playbook, deployed during the Taper Tantrum balance-of-payments scare, had mobilised roughly $34 billion; this time the response came from a position of stronger fundamentals, not crisis. The previous forex-reserves record was $728.49 billion on February 27, 2026.

Why it matters

This is the RBI managing the impossible trinity through the capital account rather than the exchange rate. By offering a subsidised hedge to banks, the central bank has bought dollars without directly intervening in the spot market and without moving the policy rate. But the dollars are not free: SBI Research estimates the hedging cost at roughly 15% of the amount raised, a quasi-fiscal transfer from the RBI to banks and depositors. And structural rupee depreciation continues — the rupee closed at 94.97 against the dollar on the day the numbers were released, and analysts warn FCNR(B) deposits will settle at only about 3% of total banking deposits, limiting the durable funding boost.

Impact for India

  • RBI: Gains a large dollar buffer to close its $137 billion of open short forward positions instead of drawing down spot reserves — a cleaner unwind of its currency defence.
  • Banks: Get stable medium-term dollar funding, lower funding costs and easier credit-deposit ratio pressure, though FCNR(B) will remain about 3% of total deposits so the structural funding boost is modest.
  • NRIs and PIOs: Earn 6-6.5% (or 7-7.5% at smaller banks) on tax-exempt dollar deposits held in India — an attractive risk-adjusted return relative to home-country dollar rates.
  • Domestic borrowers: Face tighter rupee liquidity as the RBI absorbs some of the ₹6.5 lakh crore currently in the banking system to prevent short-term rates from falling below the policy rate.
  • Exchequer: Bears the indirect cost of the concessional hedge, estimated by SBI Research at 15% of the mobilisation.

Key data

Total inflows under swap facility: $136.377 billionVs $70-$80 billion expectedVs ~$34 billion in the 2013 scheme
FCNR(B) deposits mobilised: $127.226 billion
OFCB inflows: $5.260 billion
ECB inflows: $3.891 billion
Forex reserves (record): $729.33 billionVs previous $728.49 billion on February 27As on August 21, 2026
Rupee close vs dollar: 94.97

Concepts

FCNR(B) depositFixed-term deposit held in India in designated foreign currencies (USD, GBP, EUR, JPY, AUD, CAD) by non-resident Indians, OCIs and PIOs, with interest exempt from Indian income tax.The vehicle carried $127.226 billion of the $136.377 billion total because the RBI absorbed banks' currency-hedging cost.
USD-INR swap facilityA central bank arrangement to exchange dollars for rupees at a set rate today and reverse the trade later, effectively shifting the currency-hedging risk from banks to the central bank.The RBI's concessional swap made FCNR(B) mobilisation viable for banks at 6-6.5% dollar rates.
Short forward dollar positionA commitment by the central bank to deliver dollars in the future at a pre-set rate, used to defend the currency without immediately spending spot reserves.The RBI has $137 billion of such open positions that the new FCNR(B) dollars can quietly close.
Quasi-fiscal costAn economic cost borne by the central bank rather than the budget, but with the same effect as government spending — for example, subsidising a hedge or paying above-market interest on reserves.SBI Research puts the RBI's hedging cost on this facility at around 15% of the amount raised.

Theory lens

Mundell-Fleming trilemma — an economy cannot simultaneously run a fixed exchange rate, free capital mobility and an independent monetary policy. The RBI's concessional swap is a way of buying capital-account inflows without either letting the rupee float freely or losing control of the policy rate. By subsidising the hedge, it draws in $136.377 billion of managed capital while sterilising the rupee liquidity, keeping the trilemma corner it prefers: managed float, open capital account for NRIs, independent monetary policy.

Historical parallel

2013 Taper Tantrum swap window — after the Fed signalled the end of quantitative easing, the rupee slid from around ₹54 to ₹68.85 between May and August 2013 and the RBI opened a similar concessional swap. That window pulled in about $34 billion. The 2026 version has drawn nearly four times as much, but from a position of macro strength rather than a balance-of-payments crisis — reserves are at $729.33 billion, not haemorrhaging.

Stakeholders

Gains: RBIFresh $136.377 billion buffer to close short forward dollar book without depleting spot reserves.
Gains: Commercial banksCheap, hedged dollar funding at concessional swap cost, easing credit-deposit ratio pressure.
Gains: Non-resident depositors6-6.5% (up to 7-7.5%) tax-exempt returns on dollar deposits in India.
Pressure point: RBI balance sheetHedging cost estimated at ~15% of amount raised — a quasi-fiscal transfer absorbed by the central bank.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to the FCNR(B) deposit scheme in India, consider the following statements:

  1. FCNR(B) deposits are held by non-resident Indians in designated foreign currencies such as the US dollar, pound sterling and euro.
  2. Interest earned by depositors on FCNR(B) deposits is exempt from Indian income tax so long as the depositor qualifies as a non-resident under Indian tax laws.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: Both 1 and 2

  • Statement 1: Correct. The source lists the designated foreign currencies for FCNR(B) deposits as US dollar, pound sterling, euro, Japanese yen, Australian dollar and Canadian dollar, held by NRIs, OCIs and PIOs.
  • Statement 2: Correct. The source states that interest earned on FCNR(B) deposits is exempt from Indian income tax as long as the depositor qualifies as a non-resident.

Therefore, the correct answer is Both 1 and 2.

Concept check — test your understanding

When the RBI absorbs the currency-hedging cost of a bank-mobilised FCNR(B) inflow through a concessional dollar-rupee swap, the primary economic effect on the RBI is best described as:

  1. A rise in fiscal deficit recorded in the Union Budget in the year the swap is written.
  2. A quasi-fiscal cost borne by the central bank in the form of a subsidised hedge, not routed through the budget.
  3. A direct depreciation of the rupee, because the swap requires the RBI to sell rupees in the spot market.
  4. A tightening of monetary policy, because the swap raises the repo rate charged by the RBI to banks.
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: B

  • A concessional swap that undercuts the market cost of hedging is a subsidy the central bank pays out of its own balance sheet; economists call this a quasi-fiscal cost because it has the effect of government spending without appearing in the Union Budget.
  • A is wrong because the cost sits on the RBI, not the fiscal deficit — it may eventually reduce the RBI's surplus transfer to the government, but it is not a budgetary outlay in the same year.
  • C is wrong because a swap that brings dollars in typically supports, not weakens, the rupee — and the transaction is not a spot rupee sale.
  • D is wrong because the swap operates on the currency, not the policy rate; the RBI's repo rate is set separately by the MPC.