Rajasthan's first farmer-owned agrivoltaic pilot exposes the financing gap in PM-KUSUM
A 600 kW farmer-owned agrivoltaic pilot at Kundanpura in Rajasthan combines maize and solar on the same 3 acres of land, but ICRIER's cost math shows agriPV becomes bankable for smallholders only if viability gap funding halves the payback period.
What happened
A 600 kW farmer-owned agrivoltaics (APV) plant in Kundanpura village, Bassi block, Rajasthan — the state's first — spans nearly 3 acres and feeds daytime irrigation power for around 250 farms. Owner Kojadmal Jat's annual income has risen from about ₹40,000 as a conventional farmer to about ₹3 lakh with the panels. Installed on land already under a conventional plant, retrofitting for APV cost an additional ₹35.3 lakh, funded by Kotak Mahindra's CSR programme. Rajasthan's distribution utility JVVNL will buy the electricity at ₹3.14 per unit for 25 years. Without viability gap funding (VGF), Jat's payback is nearly 12 years; with VGF, it falls to just over six years, and expected return on investment rises from 12% to 18%.
Context
APV — the co-location of solar generation with crops on the same land — has expanded from about two dozen mostly academic or private-developer pilots in India when ICRIER began its study in mid-2024 to a mid-2025 report titled 'Solar as a Third Crop to Augment Farmers' Income'. Rajasthan was chosen for the pilot because it has India's highest solar irradiation and is among the leading implementers of PM-KUSUM, the Central scheme in operation since 2019 that offers incentives to farmers using solar energy. The state now has over 3,000 MW of installed solar capacity and daytime power reaching farmers across at least 22 districts. India ranks 102nd out of 123 countries on the 2025 Global Hunger Index, sharpening the food-vs-electricity trade-off from converting productive farmland to solar-only plants.
Why it matters
APV can lift farmer income substantially — Jat's roughly eightfold jump — while sidestepping the food-security cost of pure ground-mounted solar. But elevated mounting structures add nearly ₹35 lakh above a conventional installation, and 70% of that cost has to come from a commercial bank loan at 10.25% in Jat's pilot. Ashok Gulati of ICRIER points out that lending rates hovering around 10.5% leave the economics unworkable for most smallholders. Without a targeted credit guarantee — Gulati suggests a NABARD-backed window — VGF, or a dedicated Renewable Purchase Obligation carved out for agriPV, the model stays a pilot rather than a scalable rural livelihood strategy.
Impact for India
- Smallholder farmers: APV can raise annual returns per acre to roughly ₹3 lakh to ₹4 lakh, but the ₹35 lakh incremental capital cost per project keeps most out unless a credit guarantee or VGF window opens.
- DISCOMs and state utilities: Purchase-agreement obligations at ₹3.14 per unit for 25 years transfer daytime generation risk to the utility; many DISCOMs remain reluctant given financial stress and surplus power.
- Rural grid infrastructure: Weak rural-grid absorption capacity for decentralised solar is a binding constraint on scaling PM-KUSUM-linked APV; Rajasthan is planning large-scale battery storage to absorb surplus daytime generation.
- NABARD and rural credit: No dedicated agriPV credit window currently exists, though the article floats a NABARD-backed credit guarantee as a way to lower the risk premium on smallholder solar loans.
- Central and state ministries (MNRE, state energy departments): The article documents a fragmented single-window problem — one farmer in Madhya Pradesh had to deal with three separate energy departments and took over nine months to get his PPA signed.
Key data
Concepts
Theory lens
Joint production and land opportunity cost — when two outputs can be produced together on the same land with only partial rivalry, the total product per acre exceeds the sum of what either activity would deliver alone, provided the fixed cost of the joint asset is bankable. In this pilot, the ₹35.3 lakh incremental capital cost is the fixed cost of joint production, and the VGF-versus-no-VGF spread on payback and ROI shows how a subsidy that lowers that fixed cost changes the smallholder's choice between farming, selling land for a solar plant, and adopting the joint model.
Global context
Germany, France and Japan have already established formal standards, technical benchmarks and eligibility criteria for agrivoltaic projects, giving developers a clear definition of what qualifies as agriPV. The Solar Energy Federation of India argues India has not yet defined agriPV in policy, so demonstration data across agro-climatic regions and clear eligibility rules are the next building blocks before the model can scale beyond isolated pilots.
Stakeholders
Practice Question — from the story
With reference to PM-KUSUM and the Kundanpura agrivoltaic pilot in Rajasthan, consider the following statements:
- PM-KUSUM is a Central government scheme, in operation since 2019, that offers incentives to farmers using solar energy.
- In the Kundanpura pilot, Rajasthan's distribution utility JVVNL will purchase the plant's electricity at ₹3.14 per unit for 25 years.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: Both 1 and 2
- Statement 1: Correct. PM-KUSUM is a Central scheme in operation since 2019 that offers incentives to farmers using solar energy.
- Statement 2: Correct. JVVNL will buy electricity from the Kundanpura plant at ₹3.14 per unit for 25 years.
Therefore, the correct answer is Both 1 and 2.
Concept check — test your understanding
Agrivoltaics allows a single parcel of land to produce both electricity and crops. In production economics, this arrangement is best described as:
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: C
- Elevated panels and shaded crops share the same land; partial shading even improves the microclimate for maize in the Kundanpura pilot. That is the textbook definition of joint production with only partial rivalry between outputs.
- Option A applies a public-good label to two rival, excludable outputs; option B assumes a strict substitutes relationship the pilot itself contradicts; option D confuses the fixed cost of the solar array with the market-structure conditions for natural monopoly.