UPI stays free for citizens; merchant MDR may return above a turnover threshold
The Finance Ministry has said UPI will remain free for consumers and all person-to-person transactions, but the Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 clears the way for a small MDR on large-merchant UPI and RuPay debit card payments above a turnover threshold.
What happened
The Ministry of Finance said on Saturday that consumers will not face any UPI transaction charge and that all person-to-person UPI transactions will stay free. If a Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) — the fee banks charge merchants for processing digital payments — is introduced, it will apply only above a threshold, on a limited set of merchant transactions, and at a rate "far lower" than debit or credit card MDRs. The Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026, passed by the Lok Sabha on Thursday, amends the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 to allow banks and payment system providers to levy such fees on UPI and RuPay debit card payments.
Context
UPI, launched in April 2016 by the National Payments Corporation of India, is now the world's largest real-time payment system. In 2025-26 it processed more than 24,000 crore transactions worth ₹314 lakh crore, up 30% in volume and 21% in value year on year. Section 10A of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007, read with Section 269SU of the Income-tax Act, 1961, has so far barred banks from charging for RuPay debit cards, BHIM-UPI and UPI-QR payments; the Bill removes that carve-out. The Centre has been paying an incentive of up to 0.15% of transaction value on P2M UPI payments up to ₹2,000 to small merchants — ₹8,730 crore over 2021-22 to 2024-25, which the Standing Committee on Finance found covered only 11% of the payment industry's cost.
Why it matters
UPI's zero-price model has powered a payments explosion but has been carried by direct government subsidies and by cross-subsidies inside banks. The Standing Committee on Finance's finding that the incentive scheme covered only 11% of the industry's cost tells the story: the current model is not self-financing. The Ministry now argues that widening UPI into rural and semi-urban India and keeping pace with the next growth wave requires a "balanced" framework — a threshold-based MDR on large merchants while keeping consumers and small merchants at zero. The design choice — which merchant turnover to target and at what rate — will decide whether costs are absorbed by large retailers or passed to consumers, and whether the world's cheapest payments rail stays that way.
Impact for India
- Consumers: No direct UPI charge; person-to-person transactions stay free. A LocalCircles poll of more than 20,000 people found only 2% would keep using UPI if merchants recovered fees for payments above ₹3,000, so pass-through is the key downside risk.
- Small merchants (kirana, low-turnover): Payments-industry experts expect the Section 269SU turnover threshold (annual business turnover of over ₹50 crore, though some suggest ₹1 crore–₹1.5 crore) will insulate them from any MDR.
- Large merchants: Would bear a nominal MDR — the Ministry says "far lower" than the 1–3% credit card and up to 0.9% debit card MDRs. 4% of P2M UPI transactions were above ₹2,000 in 2025-26, but that slice accounted for about two-thirds of value.
- Banks and payment providers: Get a legal path to recover processing, settlement and infrastructure costs directly from large merchants rather than relying solely on Centre incentives.
- Centre: Reduced pressure on the incentive scheme budget; the debate on whether the RBI, which transferred ₹2.86 lakh crore as dividend for 2025-26, should instead fund the rail remains open.
- Third-party UPI apps: PhonePe and Google Pay together handle almost 80% of UPI transactions; the 30% NPCI market-share cap, deferred multiple times since January 2023, is now scheduled for December 2026 — a separate but linked structural pressure on the sector.
Key data
Concepts
Theory lens
Two-sided platform pricing — on a network with two distinct user groups (payers and merchants), the platform maximises adoption by charging the more price-sensitive side less, often nothing, and recovering costs from the less elastic side. UPI has kept payers at zero to lock in mass adoption; the Ministry's threshold-based MDR shifts recovery on to large merchants, whose demand for digital acceptance is now inelastic. The design bet is that pass-through to consumers stays contained because small merchants remain outside the net.
Stakeholders
Practice Question — from the story
With reference to the Merchant Discount Rate (MDR) and India's digital payments framework, consider the following statements:
- Under existing law, banks are permitted to levy MDR on UPI transactions above a specified turnover threshold.
- UPI processed more than 24,000 crore transactions in 2025-26, worth ₹314 lakh crore.
Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: 2 only
- Statement 1: Incorrect — Section 10A of the Payment and Settlement Systems Act, 2007 currently bars any charge on UPI, BHIM-UPI and RuPay debit card payments; the Taxation and Other Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2026 seeks to remove this bar.
- Statement 2: Correct — UPI processed more than 24,000 crore transactions in 2025-26, worth ₹314 lakh crore.
Therefore, the correct answer is 2 only.
Concept check — test your understanding
Why does a two-sided payments platform such as UPI typically keep the payer (consumer) side at zero price while recovering fees only from merchants above a size threshold?
Reveal answer & explanation
Answer: C
- Two-sided platform pricing charges the less price-elastic side and subsidises the more elastic side. Payer demand for a zero-cost rail is highly elastic — as the LocalCircles poll shows, most users would abandon UPI if fees were passed through — while large merchants have inelastic demand for digital acceptance once volume is built.
- A invents a legal ban that does not exist; the current fee-free protection comes from a specific statutory carve-out (Section 10A of the PSS Act), not a general prohibition on charging consumers.
- B misreads bank economics; savings-account fees do not fund the incremental cost of every payment transaction, which is why the Standing Committee found the industry recovered only 11% of costs from Centre incentives.
- D invents a rule that does not exist; there is no international obligation to equalise consumer and merchant fees.