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India held urea supply despite Hormuz closure; phosphates now the risk

India ran through a Hormuz-closure LNG shock without a urea shortage — April–June 2026 output was 5.4% higher than a year earlier — but DAP and complex fertilisers, tied to sulphur and phosphoric acid, remain the weak link.

What happened

Fertiliser Association of India data show domestic urea production dipped to 17.5 lakh tonnes (lt) in March 2026 from 24.7 lt in March 2025, as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz since February 28 cut into Qatar and UAE LNG deliveries. Output then rose to 21 lt in April, 25.2 lt in May and 25.4 lt in June, taking April–June 2026 cumulative production to 71.5 lt — 5.4% higher than the 67.9 lt in the same quarter of 2025. India also imported 25.1 lt of urea in April-June 2026, sharply up from 8.4 lt in April-June 2025.

Context

Before the war, 53-54% of India's LNG imports came from Qatar and the UAE, mostly on long-term supply contracts. Once those routes broke, GAIL and Indian Oil pivoted to spot cargoes and diversified toward the US, Oman, Nigeria, Angola, the People's Republic of the Congo, Indonesia, Trinidad and Norway. Urea imports were secured through two tenders: Indian Potash on April 4 for 25 lt at landed prices of $935-959 per tonne, and National Fertilizers on May 27 for 17 lt at $444.9-449.3 per tonne. Rashtriya Chemicals and Fertilizers floated a third tender for 17 lt on July 29, with bids opening on August 11. Demand has also softened: all-India June-July rainfall was 12.6% below the normal average and kharif sown area is 4.7% down on last year's coverage.

Why it matters

This is a case study in supply-side crisis management in an essential input market. The government did three things at once: diversified LNG sourcing so domestic urea production could keep going, tendered aggressively to top up with imports, and absorbed the higher landed cost through the subsidy so it did not reach the farm gate. The reason it worked for urea is that LNG has many potential suppliers globally. It has not worked as well for di-ammonium phosphate (DAP), complex fertilisers and single super phosphate (SSP), whose production has fallen in April–June 2026 alongside lower imports. The chokepoint is upstream — sulphur, used to make the sulphuric acid that unlocks phosphoric acid from rock phosphate — and the same handful of West Asian and Russian suppliers dominate the trade.

Impact for India

  • Farmers: face no significant kharif shortages of urea despite the war; DAP and complex fertilisers are tighter.
  • Fiscal subsidy bill: risks overshooting Budget estimates because the government has absorbed higher import costs rather than pass them to farmers, especially on urea.
  • LNG importers (GAIL, Indian Oil): now sourcing across a wider basket — US, Oman, Nigeria, Angola, Congo, Indonesia, Trinidad and Norway — mostly at spot prices.
  • DAP and NPKS manufacturers: face rising landed phosphoric-acid prices, running at $1,700 per tonne for July-September 2026, up from $1,055 per tonne in January-March 2025.
  • Sulphur-using refiners and importers: landed sulphur prices ruling around $1,100 per tonne against a normal range of $150-250 per tonne.
  • Rabi season prep: political focus on state elections in Uttar Pradesh, Punjab and Uttarakhand in February-March raises the government's tolerance for higher subsidy outgo through winter.

Key data

Urea production, April–June 2026: 71.5 ltUp 5.4% year-on-yearVs 67.9 lt in April–June 2025
Urea imports, April–June 2026: 25.1 ltUp from 8.4 lt a year earlier
Pre-war Qatar + UAE share of India's LNG imports: 53-54%Now near zeroAs new sources ramp up: US, Oman, Nigeria, Angola, Congo, Indonesia, Trinidad, Norway
Landed phosphoric-acid price: $1,700 per tonneUp from $1,055 per tonne in January–March 2025For July–September 2026
Landed sulphur price: Around $1,100 per tonneVs a normal range of $150–250 per tonne
All-India rainfall deviation, June–July 2026: 12.6% below normalKharif sown area 4.7% below last year

Concepts

Supply diversificationSourcing a critical input from a wider set of geographies and contract types (long-term plus spot) so that a shock to any one origin has a smaller impact.India moved LNG procurement from a Qatar/UAE-heavy base to a spread across the US, Oman, Nigeria, Angola, Congo, Indonesia, Trinidad and Norway.
FeedstockThe primary input used to manufacture a downstream product; the quantity and price of feedstock largely determine output cost and availability.LNG is the feedstock for urea; sulphur and phosphoric acid are the feedstocks for DAP and complex fertilisers.
Fertiliser subsidy pass-throughThe policy choice of whether higher import costs of fertilisers are borne by the exchequer through subsidy or by farmers through higher retail prices.The government has held urea retail prices flat by absorbing the landed-price rise, raising the risk of a subsidy overshoot.

Historical parallel

The article draws a direct scale comparison to the 1973 and 1979 energy shocks, describing the current Strait-of-Hormuz-linked supply shock as 'arguably the greatest global energy supply shock in history'.

Stakeholders

Gains: FarmersNo significant urea shortages in the ongoing kharif season, and higher landed costs have not been passed on to them.
Gains: GAIL and Indian OilBuilt new LNG sourcing relationships across the US, Oman, Nigeria, Angola, Congo, Indonesia, Trinidad and Norway.
Pressure point: DAP and complex fertiliser manufacturersFace phosphoric-acid landed prices of $1,700 per tonne for July-September 2026, up from $1,055 per tonne in January-March 2025.
Pressure point: Union subsidy budgetHigher import costs absorbed to shield farmers can push the fertiliser subsidy line above Budget estimates.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to India's management of urea supply since the closure of the Strait of Hormuz on February 28, 2026, consider the following statements:

  1. Cumulative urea production during April–June 2026 was 71.5 lt, about 5.4% higher than in April–June 2025.
  2. Domestic urea output benefited from an unchanged share of LNG imports from Qatar and the UAE, which continued to supply 53-54% of India's LNG requirement through the war.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: 1 only

  • Statement 1: Correct because Fertiliser Association of India data cited in the article give April–June 2026 urea production at 71.5 lt, 5.4% higher than 67.9 lt in the same quarter of 2025.
  • Statement 2: Incorrect because the pre-war Qatar-plus-UAE share of 53-54% fell to near zero after the Hormuz closure; India kept output up by diversifying to the US, Oman, Nigeria, Angola, Congo, Indonesia, Trinidad and Norway.

Therefore, the correct answer is 1 only.

Concept check — test your understanding

In fertiliser policy, why is India's supply chain for di-ammonium phosphate (DAP) and complex fertilisers structurally harder to diversify than the supply chain for urea?

  1. DAP is produced only from indigenous rock phosphate reserves, which are geographically concentrated in a few Indian states.
  2. DAP consumption is banned in most fertiliser-exporting economies, so international markets for the finished product are thin.
  3. DAP and complex fertilisers depend on sulphur and phosphoric acid whose global production is concentrated in a small set of West Asian and Russian suppliers, unlike LNG which has many origins.
  4. The Fertiliser Association of India caps DAP imports at a fixed share of consumption, limiting how much can be sourced abroad.
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: C

  • The article's core diagnosis: sulphur (from which sulphuric acid is made) and phosphoric acid are dominated by QatarEnergy, Saudi Aramco, ADNOC, Iran and Russia, so the DAP supply chain has fewer substitute origins to pivot to when any one origin goes offline.
  • Option A misstates the geology — India relies heavily on imported rock phosphate; DAP is not made only from indigenous reserves.
  • Option B is fabricated; no such ban exists, and DAP is widely traded globally.
  • Option D invents a policy that does not exist — the Fertiliser Association of India is an industry body, not an import-cap regulator.