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Explained EconomicsIndian EconomyCrude Oil ImportsRussiaChokepoints

Russia now supplies over half of India's crude — but Black Sea risk is the new choke

As Saudi shipments face Houthi risk, India is expected to lean harder on Russian crude, which already made up over 50% of imports in June. But Ukrainian strikes on Russia's Black Sea export terminals — Novorossiysk supplied 28% of India's Russian barrels — make Moscow's export chain, not Bab al-Mandab, the tighter constraint for Indian refiners.

What happened

India's Russian crude imports have surged from about 1 million barrels per day (bpd) in February to a record 2.6 million bpd in June, more than 50% of total oil imports, and July shipments are tracking similar levels, ship-tracking data cited by Kpler show. If the Houthi threat to Saudi vessels crossing Bab al-Mandab escalates, refiners are expected to lean further on Russia, drawing down commercial inventories and adding Fujairah-loaded Murban barrels from the UAE, which bypasses both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. Novorossiysk's Sheskharis terminal — a key Russian export node for India — halted operations after a Ukrainian attack.

Context

India imports over 88% of its crude oil, so supply security depends on keeping alternate routes and suppliers alive at all times. Before the West Asia war, over 40% of imports came via the Strait of Hormuz. As Hormuz traffic collapsed, refiners pivoted rapidly to Russia — from around 1 million bpd in February to 2.6 million bpd in June — using the Suez-Red Sea corridor to bring barrels in. That corridor now runs past the same Bab al-Mandab chokepoint the Houthi militia is threatening for Saudi cargoes. Russia has been able to lift exports partly because Ukrainian strikes forced several of its refineries offline, freeing barrels for export.

Why it matters

The centre of gravity of India's supply risk is quietly shifting from West Asia to the Black Sea. Novorossiysk supplied about 28% of India's Russian crude imports in June, and 840,000 bpd of the terminal's 1.1 million bpd loadings that month went to India. Rerouting from the Black Sea, unlike the Red Sea, has few alternatives — the region's export capacity cannot easily be replaced by African, American or South American cargoes given voyage times. Two secondary risks: Urals discounts (around $7/barrel to Dubai before the latest escalation) have disappeared as buyers compete, and Russian refineries returning from repair could pull as much as 1 million bpd out of the export market.

Impact for India

  • Indian refiners: near-term hedge is intact — Russian, UAE Murban and inventory drawdown cover a Saudi shortfall — but margins compress as Urals moves from discount to premium.
  • Public sector oil marketing companies: dependence on Russian crude (over 50% of imports in June) makes Novorossiysk shutdowns a first-order operational risk.
  • Central government: any sustained rise in landed crude cost feeds into fuel-price and subsidy math.
  • Consumers: retail fuel prices are still under administered discipline, but any prolonged spike would either compress OMC margins or force pass-through.
  • MEA and diplomatic bandwidth: managing Russian, Saudi, UAE and US relationships simultaneously — with a June Russian import share above 50% — narrows India's room for manoeuvre.

Key data

Russia's share of India's crude imports, June: Over 50%Up from about 1 million bpd in FebruaryRecord 2.6 million bpd
India's crude import dependence: Over 88% of oil requirement
Novorossiysk share in India's Russian imports, June: About 28%Of 1.1 million bpd loaded there, 840,000 bpd went to India
Saudi East-West (Yanbu) pipeline supply to India: About 300,000-500,000 bpdBuffer as long as Red Sea transit continues
Bab al-Mandab vessel crossings: 31 per day (past 3 days)Down from 43 per day in first half of JulyPer S&P Global data

Concepts

ChokepointA narrow shipping passage — a strait, canal or bay — whose disruption can bottleneck a disproportionate share of global trade flows.The Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab are the two critical chokepoints on India's crude-import routes.
Supply hedge / crude slate diversificationThe practice by refiners of sourcing crude from multiple suppliers so that no single disruption cripples supply.India's crude slate, drawing on dozens of suppliers, is Kpler's cited reason a Saudi shortfall is judged manageable.
Discount to benchmark / premium to benchmarkThe price at which a specific crude grade trades relative to a benchmark like Brent or Dubai; reflects quality, location and demand conditions.Urals was earlier offered at around a $7/barrel discount to Dubai; that discount has disappeared and Russian barrels are now moving at premiums.
Shadow fleetTankers operating with obscured ownership, insurance or transponder use, often deployed to keep flows moving under sanction pressure or attack risk.Russian-linked tankers around Novorossiysk are reportedly switching off transponders, part of a shadow fleet Russian operators lean on under drone-attack risk.

Global context

China and Turkey are competing with India for Urals barrels, tightening incremental Russian availability even as India's Russia share climbs above 50% of imports. Of Russia's record 4.5 million bpd of crude exports in June, about 55% went to India.

Stakeholders

Gains: Indian refiners with Russian supply contractsAccess to record 2.6 million bpd Russian volumes in June acts as a hedge against Saudi supply-line disruption.
Gains: UAE (Murban grade)Fujairah-loaded barrels bypass both the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab and can reach India in five to six days.
Pressure point: Indian refiners on landed costUrals crude, previously offered at about a $7/barrel discount to Dubai, is now moving at a premium as India and China compete for the same barrels.
Pressure point: Saudi Aramco's India volumesHouthi threat to Saudi shipping via Bab al-Mandab could push refiners to substitute away, adding up to four weeks of transit if cargoes are rerouted around Africa.

Practice Question — from the story

With reference to India's crude oil sourcing amid the ongoing West Asia disruption, consider the following statements:

  1. In June, Russia supplied more than 50% of India's total crude oil imports.
  2. Russia's flagship Urals crude is currently trading at a discount of around $7/barrel to Dubai crude in the Indian market.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

  1. 1 only
  2. 2 only
  3. Both 1 and 2
  4. Neither 1 nor 2
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: 1 only

  • Statement 1: Correct. Ship-tracking data cited by Kpler show Russian imports at a record 2.6 million bpd in June — over 50% of India's total oil imports — up from about 1 million bpd in February.
  • Statement 2: Incorrect. The $7/barrel discount is the earlier level. Since the latest escalation, that discount has disappeared and Russian barrels are moving at premiums as Indian refiners compete with China and Turkey for supply.

Therefore, the correct answer is 1 only.

Concept check — test your understanding

In the context of Russian crude oil exports, the term 'shadow fleet' most accurately refers to which of the following?

  1. Russian refineries operating below full capacity because of Ukrainian drone attacks
  2. Tankers operating with obscured ownership, insurance or transponder use to keep oil flowing under sanction or attack risk
  3. Strategic reserve fuel stockpiles held by consumer countries for emergency use
  4. A category of refined petroleum products traded at a discount to Brent crude
Reveal answer & explanation

Answer: B

  • The shadow fleet is precisely the workaround infrastructure — tankers with hidden ownership chains, non-Western insurance and, as seen at Novorossiysk, switched-off transponders — that keeps Russian barrels moving despite sanctions and now attack risk.
  • Option A confuses two separate constraints. Refineries offline for repair are a supply-side factor, not the fleet at all.
  • Option C describes strategic petroleum reserves, held by consumer states like the US or India — a demand-side buffer, not Russia's export logistics.
  • Option D refers to product-market discounts on refined fuels, not the fleet that carries crude.